| There is a great progress in acquisition market. It takes a positiverole of improving coporate governance and optimizing the coporateresource. But we couldn't ignore the problem emerging in the process ofacquisition. Beause of less power balancing and less effective supervision,there are a number of cases that the larger shareholders after the transitionof coporate control extract the small shareholder's interest. By analyzingthe way of extraction—excess control, the paper investigate the acquirer'smotive and his behaviours so that we could take further steps toregularize the acquirers' behaviours and promote the efficiency ofacquisition market.Theorically first, this paper analyse the effect of the coporate controltransition on coporate governance. And we also discuss its negectiveeffect when the acquirer gets the private gain of coporate control byacquisition. Then we bring in the excess control theory and its analyzingmodel. Then we describe the current situation of coporate control market.Finally with specimen for coporate control transition which occur in Shenand Hu market from 2001 to 2003, and from the four perspective of theexcess control of the real controller,the excess control in coporate board,the power balancing among the large shareholders,the excess control ofdifferent kinds of acquirers, We empirically analyes the relation betweenacquirer's excess control and coporate performance. The outcome is asfollows:(1) The acquirer's cash flow right have a significant positiveeffect on coporate performance;(2) The excess control of acquirer incoporate board and excess control of real controllers both have asignificant negective effect on coporate performance;(3) The other largeshareholders existed have a positive effect on coporate performance, butnot significantly;(4) The excess control of state acquirers in board have asignificant negective on ROE; the excess control of real controller of theother coporate have a significant negective effect on ROE. |
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