A Study On The Principal Agent-Incentive Model In Enterprises Affiliated To Research Institutes

The enterprise affiliated to research institute (EARI) is a special type of state-owned enterprise subsidiary to the Public Service Institute, and it appears at the period that the planned economy was transforming to the market economy. The obstacle of EARI's developing is the characteristic of an adjunct and the limitation on mechanism, system and ownership of the state-owned enterprise. The key of EARI's restructuring is to build the corporate governance in EARI by perfecting the principal-agent connection between the research institute and the manager. This study takes the manager of the EARI as object, and tries to perfect the principal-agent connection by rebuilding the incentive system of manager. First analysis is made on the common incentive measure by the game theory, and point out the inclination of choice of the client and the agent to these measures. Then the characters of the EARI and the manager are analyzed, by which it is found that the agent has the characteristic of the knowledge worker and the career manager. A new incentive model for the manager, and study the model by a sample is built. This study provides a method to the designing of the incentive system aim at the EARI, which consists with theory basis, mathematical analysis, parameters, sampling technology, and actualizing regulations. It is proved that an incentive system, suitable to the EARI and the manager, can be built quickly by this method. The new incentive system can evade the agent problem efficient, and it can boost the agent work hard.