Research On Tunneling Of The Controlling Shareholders Of Our Listed Companies Based On M&A

M&A are the eternal subject of the capital market. Originally, it is away to optimize resources disposition of listed companies, readjustmenteconomic structure and realize industry upgrading. But now, manycontrolling shareholders tunnel listed companies and invade the interestsof the minority shareholders via M & A as the administrative monopoly ofthe listed system, the controlling status of the largest shareholders and thedeficiency of legal system to protect minority shareholders whichconstrains the development of our capital market seriously. So, there'sgreat significance to the development of our capital market to study itcomprehensively, analyze the basic reasons which it produces thoroughlyand provide basis to the authority for making policy.First of all, this paper reviews status quo of tunneling of controllingshareholders both at home and abroad, then this paper discusses the mainway of tunneling of controlling shareholders, and studies the relationshipbetween M&A and tunneling. We do empirical researches about M&Aand tunneling, using event study, multiple linear regression andaccounting methods, the overall conclusion that the paper draws is asfollows: firstly, the negative CAR reflects the controlling shareholders'tunneling of listed companies via M&A; secondly, there's an averseU-shaped relationship between largest shareholders' ownership and theirtunneling; thirdly, companies with state-owned enterprises and group as the largest shareholders are easy to tunnel; fourthly, the higher the priceof stock transferring, the more possibility the tunneling to happen; fifthly,both sides belong to the related industries is not easy to tunnel. Then weanalyzes the mechanism of M&A and tunneling, and also explained thesystem root of tunneling. At last, this paper discusses the measures togovern tunneling of controlling shareholders.