An Empirical Research On The Shareholding Motivation Effect Of Chinese Listed Companies

In the beginning of this paper, the domestic and foreign results of equity incentive research are stated. On the basis of this, human capital theory, Principal-agent theory and distribution and risk motivation theory are analyzed in detail as the basic theory of equity incentive theory. Besides, the intrinsic logic of equity incentive theory is elaborated from the perspective of game theory.For the seek of describing the actual effect of equity incentive more objectively, the essay discussed the hypothesis and measurement criteria and indicators of the equity incentive effects. The final effect of equity motivation is the combination of "convergence of interests" effect and "managerial entrenchment" effect. The former is positive and the later is negative. Considering the actual research conditions, we choose "performance" as the measurement criteria, "rate of net return on capital" and "earnings per share" as the measurement indicators.In the empirical part, first the effectiveness of equity incentive to improve the company's performance is verified through an independent sample T-test. Then this paper does a regression analysis between the management shareholding ratio and the company's performance. From the regression analysis, we get a "Z" shaped curve. This curve reflects that when the management shareholding ratio is in (0, 0.001％) and (0.7％,∝), the company's performance rises with the addition of the independent variable and when the management shareholding ration is in (0.001％, 0.7％), the company's performance drops along with the addition of the independent variable.