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The Research On Game Model Of Establishing Concession Term Of BOT Project

Posted on:2008-06-09Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y M LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360218953022Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The relative deficiency of infrastructure project has been the obstacle for many countries to develop their economy. The financing requirement of infrastructure project is much too great, most countries can not afford this if it is barely dependent on governments'investment, but the BOT project financing solves this problem well. It systematically combines the government of the host country with the international enterprise with the large-scale infrastructure project. On the one hand, it provides the way for government to construct the infrastructure project without investing risks, on the other hand, it supplies a stable method for international enterprise to make their maximal interest as long as possible in the public fields of the host government, so we can conclude that the BOT project financing will have a wide development.The most important factor of BOT project's success is how to determine the concession term, which is also the focus of the concession contract and the key to assure both the investor's and the government's interests. So there is the problem of how to determine the concession term in order to assure the reasonable interest of the government and maximize the utility of the investor.In this paper, where there had introduced the means of game theory and established a dynamic game of incomplete information---bargaining game model between the government and the investor. The information of the two sides of the game was the utility-function, which was based on the opportunity cost and the risk preference of the investor. At first, opportunity cost of the investor, which was divided into the minimum anticipant rate of return and the risk rate of return, and then we had a measurement of the two indexes until got a approximate measurement of the opportunity cost; In addition, the risk of Nash equilibrium solution was indicated in this paper, that was the different risk players would have effect on the equilibrium solution, and then the risk was measured with the information entropy. Thus, we got a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium solution of this game model, and then the above model was applied in a actual example to validate its rationality, in which the corresponding concession terms of BOT were given in different conditions.
Keywords/Search Tags:BOT, concession term, opportunity cost, risk preference, bargaining
PDF Full Text Request
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