The Interest Game Research Of Behavior In SOE's MEBO

MEBO is one of state-owned enterprise's multi-property-rights. Theoretically, MEBO is the conjugate of MBO and ESOP , embodies the management's and the employee's status and value. The paper researches the percentage of shares between the management and the employee, purchasing price and monitoring issues in SOE's MEBO by using game theory , the main research contents and corresponding results are as follows:Firstly, we elaborate the concept and the related theory of SOE's MEBO, analyze its necessity and implementation .Secondly, we define that the behavior in SOE's MEBO include the government , the enterprise, the management , the employee, the strategic investor, the seeking, specifically analyze their behavior and interest orientation in SOE's MEBO .Thirdly, we use the game theory to establish a complete information dynamic model to calculate percentage of shares between the management and the employee, the model provides theoretical and quantitative methods for the percentage confirmation of shares. Meanwhile, we confirm that the first has the superiority characteristic in bargain complete information dynamic model.Fourthly, combining the purchasing price question in SOE's MEBO, we use the game theory to establish a bargain incomplete information dynamic model, it's the basis for them to get Bayesian equilibrium in the condition of the incomplete information.Fifthly, we use the game theory to analyze the monitoring issues in SOE's MEBO, the model gives the theoretical support for the government to adopt monitoring strategies.Finally, combining the analyze of game model, we give some advises.