The Prompting And Monitoring Of Principal-Agent

When the ownership of enterprises and management rights separate, the problem of principal-agent emerges.Because of asymmetric information ,the principal and the agent pursuit their own interests, using their own information superiority and opportunism.In the analysis of the problem of principal-agent,we have to prevente the opportunistic behaviour of the principal and the agent,it is important for principal to give agent incentive and oversight contracts. Supervising includes the Supervising between principal and agent or between external legal and chief or or principal employs the third supervisior to oversight agent.This paper primarily considers three problems of principal-agent:the features of incentive contract;without supervising ,the optimal incentive mechanism under symmetry and asymmetry information;with supervising, promoting concludfness.Firstly,basing on the traditional models of incentive contract,this paper considers the instance of stochastic output under certain effort levels,and gives the condition of incentive contract.The result indicates that introducedincentive contract is close to reality case. Secondly,Without seperving,We design the optimal incentive contract to agent when introducing stochastic probability ,discuss the significance of the stochastic probability .At last,with supervising,We give the optimal incentive contract to the supervior and the agent,discuss the condition of concludfness between the supervisor and the agent,introducing the model of concludfness.