The Research On Contract And Mechanism In R&D Cooperation With Supplier Based On Incomplete Information

With the development of low carbon economy,firms need to give innovative research and development(R&D)in technology,equipment,services,management and other aspects.Thus,the horizontal and vertical innovative R&D cooperation become popular in supply chain.However,a large volumes of waste products are produced with accelerating update of the product.The pollution caused by the unreasonable recycling and reuse of waste is threatening human health and global ecosystems.Under such a background,many developed countries have implemented the policy of Extended Producer Responsibility(EPR),and the fundamental aim of EPR is to encourage producer to consider the low-carbon recycling from the source of the research and development in the product life cycle.It can be seen that product design for low carbon is one of the goals for firm's future research and development.In practice,due to the timeliness and risk of R&D innovation,the producer should cooperate with upstream and downstream participator,to obtain the resources,technology and capital and achieve win-win results by complementing each other with their own advantages.However,the firms in the supply chain often conceal private information based on maximizing their own profits.Therefore,the principals are in the face of adverse selection and moral hazard under asymmetric information.Therefore,this paper comprehensively uses a variety of methods,such as principal-agent theory,incomplete contract theory and optimization theory,to study the contract coordination mechanism with information asymmetry,between the innovative product manufacturer(producer),the R&D cooperative supplier(researcher)and the financial institutions.Further more,the R&D supplier is considered to involve in the low-carbon closed-loop supply chain,and also study the incentive mechanism for the producer under the uncertain information and the asymmetric information.Four main problems are studied in this paper,and the research conclusions are as follows:(1)Screening contract of innovate product R&D outsourcing under asymmetric information.In the innovate products R&D outsourcing project,the asymmetric cost information of the outsourcing enterprise brings income risk to the contracting enterprise.Focused on the adverse selection and the probability of successful development issues,the screening model in principal-agent theory is used to encourage the outsourcing researcher to disclose her real cost information.The contracting producer provides the outsourcing screening contract to the researcher which divided into two kinds,the higher cost factor and the lower cost factor.The screening contract is designed with two main parameters called fixed payment and revenue sharing coefficient to induce the outsourcing researcher to choose the suitable contract and give the optimal level of effort.The conclusions imply that the fixed payment and revenue sharing coefficient in screening contract are affected by the probability of two kinds researchers.The researcher with lower cost factor gets not only reservation utility but extra information rent,while the higher kind only obtain the reservation.The producer's expected profit is decreasing with the probability of the high cost factor increasing,at the same time,the revenue sharing and the fixed payment for the high cost factor researcher are increasing and decreasing respectively.(2)Low-carbon R&D incentive mechanism based on EPR system for waste production recycling.In the two-stage closed-loop supply chain system between producer and R&D supplier,this paper investigates the incentive effects to R&D designing and to the carbon emission reduction by implementing Extended Producer Responsibility(EPR),considering consumer preference for low carbon recycling.As the leader of Stackelberg game,producer designs two kinds of R&D cooperative contracts to the researcher:pre-commitment(S-P)model given a revenue sharing ratio at the beginning of R&D stage,and delayed commitment(S-D)model given the ratio after observing the real component.After analyzing and comparing the total profit of the supply chain and the emission reduction under two different contracts,the results indicate producer need to pay the value for the observing information,so the profit of the supply chain under the pre-commitment model is higher than the delayed commitment model.However,pre-commitment model is not always better than delayed model about reducing carbon emission,when the producer plays a significant role in product emission or when the factor of carbon tax and the low carbon R&D technology coefficient are satisfied with certain region.The two partners should also pay attention to both the low-carbon R&D technology level and the government carbon tax.When the R&D technology is lower,increasing the carbon tax may have a negative effect on emission reduction.(3)The screening contract revision mechanism with the asymmetric information of low-carbon R&D technology level.On the basis of last chapter,this paper further studies how to revise the screening contract after observing the development result of the component for the producer.The whole cooperation process is divided into two stages,the R&D and assembling process,and the marketing and recycling process.It is more difficult to solve the issue and get the Pareto improving than the incentive mechanism without revision.The study results show that the R&D supplier would balance the efforts in two stages based on her true technology level in the closed-loop supply chain.The carbon reduction in recycling process and development of low carbon technology level is not a simple linear relationship,so that the producer can not judge the emission reduction effect by the researcher's technology level.The changes of contract factors to the low-type of researcher are more flexible to avoid disguising.The contract revision also depends on the contributions of the two partners in the recycling stage.(4)Financing decisions between supplier and producer under asymmetric sale price information.A lot of capital investment are required in the innovative research and development,so this paper focus on the operation management and financing issue that the producer with capital constraint loans from the bank to obtain the optimal purchase quantity.However.the market demand of new product is uncertain,and the price of the new product is asymmetric information for the supplier.To avoiding the bankruptcy of the producer,this paper gives a pooling contract and a screening contract with the supplier as the Stackelberg game leader to maximize the profit.The study shows a negative relation between the purchase quantity and the loan interest.Thus,the producer would like to tell a low price of the new product in order to get a lower loan interest rate.The conclusions indicate that are the screening contract is more helpful to motivate retailers to tell the private information and also to increase the profit of the whole supply chain than pooling contract.The screening model brings more profit to the supplier than pooling contract.The profit of higher price producer is influenced by the proportionality factor and the difference between two prices.Although the producer with lower price only gets reservation profit,his purchase quantity and the market are increased.The producer with higher price will get information rent to avoid bad lenders drove out good ones in mortgages.The research of this paper provides some new ideas and methods to solve the issues of R&D contract design under asymmetric information.Further more,the research background is extended to the closed-loop system of low carbon recycling,and the conclusion and management insights offer some theoretical basis for the producer.R&D supplier and relevant departments when they make operating decisions.Finally,according to above analysis and study,this paper proposes the limitations of this study and issues worthy of further study in this field.