| The thesis study the problem of "Management Corruption" and "Adverse Selection" of China insurance industry with current situation of supervision and stimulation for top management in insurance corporations, and aim to find that how to improve the monitoring and incentive mechanism.This paper, based on the principle-agent theory, analyses the current issue in insurance agent in China that both supervision week combines with over intervention and insufficient inventiveness existed with irrelative performance measurement, further investigate the management structure of insurer influences the monitoring and incentive mechanism, find out the prime causation, lastly raise how to improve monitoring and incentive mechanism for top management in current insurance company, in monitoring mechanism , need to strengthen external monitoring and professional self-discipline, establishing agent-market; in incentive mechanism , One method is utilizing economic stimulation and non-economic stimulation together , The other is exploring the feasibility which 'stock right' stimulation is applied in current insurance company, Finally raise one solution that how to exert the function of monitoring and stimulating evenly in current insurance management. |
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