Game-theory Analysis Of Regional Convergence Of Industrial Structure Of China From The Perspective Of Local Government

Regional convergence of industrial structure refers to the region in the development and evolution of the industrial structure that has shown some common tendency, refers to the area between the leading industries choice, industrial organization of the size and level of technology and products to identify areas of duplication structured phenomenon.Since the 1980s, the convergence of industrial areas has plagued issues of the reform and development. Its outstanding performance is "large and all-embracing," and "small and complete", the regional differences tend to narrow the structure, the geographical characteristics of industries are alike, localities industries are a complete range of production and gradually form a complete system, the major industries and products produced uneven distribution of space, concentration decline, mutual lack of due division of work and cooperation, leading to inefficient allocation of resources by society as a whole, serious waste of resources, poor economies of scale enterprises. Although since the 1990s the convergence of industrial structure has improved, it still hampers economic restructuring and optimization, and affects the acceleration of the building of socialism.Using methodologies of mathematical model, game theory, empirical test, this paper's main areas are aimed to figure out objective reasons, cognitive reasons and institutional reasons for the specificity, to analyze its existence and development laws, and to make the corresponding responses from the perspective of local government.It is divided into seven parts: Part one presents aiming problems, research purposes, the analytical structure and innovations of this paper; Part Two describes basic concepts and the status of research; Part three makes historical and empirical analysis of the convergence of the industrial; Part IV digs out the objective reasons, cognitive reasons and institutional reasons from the perspective of game theory; Part V proposes solutions from the perspectives of modulation of profit-distribution policy and evolutionary game-theory model; Part VI describes a more general analytical model and makes empirical test for it; Part VII generalizes the policies for solving these problems.