Analysis On Economic Motivation Of Tax Planning

As China's tax revenue rose year by year, on the one hand because of economic growth, on the other hand the taxpayer is a tremendous contribution. However, economic growth is more behind of the growth rate of tax revenue. The gap between them is the sacrifice of the taxpayers make. Therefore, The paper analyzes the economic motivation of tax planning. The motivation of tax planning is not just to reduce tax cost for taxpayers, maximize the value of enterprises, and enhance the competitiveness of enterprise, what's more important is to foster the tax planning sense of taxpayers, so as to protect their own rights. This dissertation under the guidance of contract economics, microeconomics, games theory, etc, means to explore the economic motivation of tax planning. In the paper, the main contents are as follows:1. The paper descriminates the basic conception of enterprise tax planning, pointing out that enterprise tax planning contains of tax saving, tax avoidance, tax burden onto, and tax zero risk, "tax trap" avoidance; It analyzes the macro and micro objectives of tax planning.2. On the basis of contract economics, it analyzes the tax contract between government and enterprises; At the same time, it reviews taxpayers make profits by making-contract; It analyzes tax planning under the condition of symmetrical uncertainty.3. It analyzes rational assumption and rational choice of tax planning; Using of the supply-demand curve and the consumer,producer surplus theory, it proofs the inevitability of tax planning; The study shows that taxpayer enlarges the yield scale by depressing the marginal cost curve and average variable cost curve. At the same time, the action of tax planning will reduce the difference between the producers' price and the consumers' price, and then benefit the both the producers and the consumers but not only to consumers.4. Basis on games theory, it points out if there is no other way to reduce tax burden, tax planning is the best strategy, and builds the games model of tax planning and tax evasion, works out the equilibrium solution of the model under different condition.It analyses the game of tax planning between taxpayer and tax authority, points out if tax authority believes that the legal probability (k)of tax planning is big or the penalty(c1) is small, (planning, no checking) is the equilibrium solution. When k is small or c1 is big, there is no pure strategies of Nash equilibrium. It analyses the mixed strategies Nash equilibrium, works out the best condition that taxpayers make tax planning, and explains more about whether the tax planning is legal or on aspect of the space of planning, mistake of the tax administration and the ability of taxpayer.