Signaling Game Models For Bank Credit Under Asymmetric Information Conditions

In the 1990's, people began to attach more and more attention to the important role of small-and-medium enterprises(SMES) in our economic reform and development. From the views of SMES, The credit rationing from commercial banks is the most methods of obtaining external financing. But the difficulty of obtaining external financing becomes a bottle-ne<;k to restrict the development of SMES. Therefore, make a study on bank loan to SMES is significant both in theory and in practice.The core question of the SMES credit facility is asymmetric information and information costs. This paper constructs a double signaling game model between SMES and commercial banks of the credit relation on the base of the asymmetric information in the SMES market. The primary research content and results are obtained as follows:1. The paper analysised the credit risk in china's credit market from the perspective of the asymmetric information, and researched the formation of credit risk.2. From the information which enterprises deliveried to banks, the paper choosed the expected return rate and the risk rate as the signals of risk identification, and proved that the two parameters are the signals recognizing the credit risk.3. The paper constructed a double signaling game model in the stage of loan application on the base of the expected return rate and the risk rate, and then solved the optimal solution of the game model by using K-T condition, that is the separation balanced solution and the confusion balanced solution of the game model.4. According to the results of the optimal solution, the paper analysised the characteristics and the risk of the SMES loan, and expounded how to manage the risk of the SMES loan from two aspects: the risk identification and the risk control, and then suggested to reduce the risk of loans to SMES by improving the external environment.