Research On Credit Risk In Asymmetric Information

Commercial banks as a financial agency change the commission relation between the borrowers and the depositors to the relation between the banks and borrowers. There out, the credit risk of asymmetric information focus on banks. At on time, bring the problem of the banks how to control the credit risk, so there are theoretical and practical signification.This paper, on account of information economics, combined with analysis of actual cases, probes into the emergence mechanism for credit risk of domestic commercial banks in terms of asymmetric information. This paper also applies game theory to set up game models for ante-accommodation and post-accommodation. In the information model for ante-accommodation, commercial banks expect the occurrence of separate game equivalence not the pooled game equivalence, for in pooled game equivalence, commercial banks may easily choose adverse selection to provide loans because of asymmetric information, while in the supervision model for post-accommodation, banks and enterprises hardly make pure strategic equivalence, that is, they can not achieve Pareto optimum in the same time, meanwhile, when the supervision model for post-accommodation achieve pooled strategic equivalence, we will make use of probabilities of enterprises not keeping their promises and probabilities of bank supervision as indexes for describing qualitatively the credit risk for enterprises and the credit risk for bank supervision.