The Commercial Bank Credit Risk Keeps Watch Information Asymmetry Studying

An important reason, which will cause modern credit risks, is asymmetric information. In the credit market, the credit funds movement procedure of the commercial bank mainly involves two main bodies, the bank and the enterprise. In the transaction process, the enterprise is the fund user, who has full information about the income and risks of the actual investment project, which has borrowed funds. So the enterprise has the superiority in information. In order to gain the capital the investment needs, the enterprise is easy to create behavior dissimilation in the capital operation procedure. Behavior dissimilation of the enterprise makes the commercial bank unable to access to information promptly, accurately and comprehensively and unable to make reliable judgments for the credit quality and the probability to repay the loan of the borrower. Thus there exists the possibility that policy-making faults cause credit loses, as is the hidden trouble for financial crises. Obviously, how to exploit the way to diminish financial crises and establish a reasonable credit policy-making mechanism theoretically and practically is urgent and vital in Chinese finance world. Based on the above, some correlation theories of economics of information and game theory are used to probe into the avoidance and evasion of credit risks in this paper.In the angle of economics of information, the thesis probes into the credit risk formation mechanism with asymmetric information and system arrangement and ways of credit risk management. Firstly, general theoretical analysis is made about adverse selection and moral hazard emerging from asymmetric information in credit activities, which are the reasons of credit risk. At the same time, general models are set up for the prevention of adverse selection and moral hazard. Secondly, considering the weak budget constraint which is the essential characteristic of china credit market, the thesis studies the particularity and severity of credit risk caused asymmetric information in china credit activities. Thirdly, the actions between commercial bank and firm in the application and repayment of loans in china credit market have been deeply analyzed by the ways of game theory. At last, suggestions about how to eliminate asymmetric information in credit market. In the credit market, there are a mass of asymmetric information phenomenon. As the major cause in commercial bank credit risk, Adverse selecting moral risk can not be avoided in a certain extent, especially in China. We can reduce information asymmetry by driving the public credit transactions environment and legal institutions environment construction , building the high-effect credit Management Information System , carrying out a commercial bank actively in credit coming way such as taking up excellent strategy , building standard unified credit business technological process in game bring about bank credit risk.