An Empirical Study On Managerial Ownership And Performance Of Chinese Listed Companies Under Government Intervention

With the capital market promoting,more and more listed companies's ma nagershold ing companies 's shares,mea nwhile,researchers pay more attention to the researchabout the relationship of ma nageria l ownership and performa nce of companies. Managerialownership can solve the agency problem,red uce agency costs and increase coroporatevalue.This thesis summa rize the previous analysis. Under the case of governmentintervention, combining the characters of our capital marketet, study the relationshipbetween ma nageria l ownership and corporate performa nce,mea nwhile,a nalysis the effectbetween the ma nageria l ownership of state corporate and non-sta te corporate andcorporate performa nce.This paper selected 310 listed companies issued before 2003.12.31,on the Shanghai Stock Excha nge and issued A-shares only as research samples.The panelsamples is 2005-2007,pick ing up the information of the total asstes, ma nagementsharehold ings, the corporate levera ge, the company size, the rate of top one shareholder,and other releva nt information,chosing return on assets (ROA)and Tobin's Q value, as ameasure of corporate performa nce, chosing the corporate levera ge, the company size, therate of top one shareholder, of listed companies and etc as control variables,build ingmultiple nonlinear model, using quadratic equation iterative method test the relationshipbetween ma nageria l ownership (MS) and corporate performa nce (ROA,Tobin's Q).Empirica l studies show that the relationship between the ma nageria l ownership andthe corporate performa nce is curve relationship.The rate of ma nageria l ownership in statecorporate is lower,a nd the effect of share incentive is also lower.