Research On Construction Bidding Mode With Asymmetric Information

The construction market's information is incomplete. In the surrounding, the bidding between the employer and bidder may depress the trading efficiency grievously. And in the course of adverse-selection, which kinds of bid-inviting pattern can maximize the employer's project utility and how to avoid the question of adverse-selection.And now, in our country the bidding mode is change from basic bid price to the. This paper is based on the investigation of the current construction marketing, used the asymmetric information theory, game theory, information economics and trannsaction cost theory to analysis the basic bid price mode and the LBT (the lowest bid tendering method) and MFT(the most favorable low tendering method) in the non-basic tender mode. And discussed the advantage of the non- mode and its applicability. And this paper also try to discuss the questions in the bidding process of seeking- rents, irrationality low price and so on. And also this paper builds repeated game model to exanimate the equalization of the bidding period.And finally this paper wants to seek some measure for example to build credit system, to popularize the project management corporation and to use the construction bond institution to reduce the employer's project risk. And all this is try to offer some academic foundation to the mechanism design of bid-invite pattern and the selecting of the tender evaluation mode.