Research On Mechanism Of Supply Chain Coordination Based On Incentive Contract And Game Theory

With the division of labor and specialization further evolving in new industrial chain, supply chain mechanism is usually good for making the enterprise and his supply chain network gain necessary competitive advantage. Supply chain mechanism may be considered as a set of methods that could be used to make supply network global optimization and manage uncertainty.This dissertation mostly analyzes all kinds of original causes that is essential for omnigenous problems in supply chain mechanism based on literature review. Then we approach the incentive contract designing under the condition that constraint of Downside-Risk control is satisfied, which could conduce the supply chain coordinated well. After that, considering the practice background of the realistic industrial environment, we make a study of the great importance of outside force intervening (e.g. government interfering) to supply network for supply chain mechanism. The main content and academic innovation within the dissertation follow as:1. The dissertation addresses a definition of supply chain coordination, the attribute that a specific sub-supply-network indistinctly possesses its own boundary, and the structure of essential causes that induce the supply chain coordination problems within organizations as well as a framework for controlling and assessing some mechanism of supply chain coordination. Further more, the dissertation reaches a conclusion that helping to obtain sustained competitive advantage is the achievement of running appropriate supply chain coordination mechanism. Five dimensions composed of degree of sharing resource structure, decision-making style, control level, incentive modes and alignment between SCM (Supply Chain Management) ability and mechanism are used to control and assess the performance of coordination mechanism operation. And what is more, the dissertation takes advantage of TCT (Transaction Cost Theory) to measure the cost increment by executing every dimension aspect of coordination mechanism. And we can also compare rates of contribution margin by the relative cost increment to total profit increment in specific sub-supply-network to determine better improvement direction.2. Within supply chain coordination mechanism, the dissertation pays attention to risk attitude considering and interest sharing, and mainly discusses the contract designing in a three-tier supply chain. An incentive contract between a risk-averse distributor and a downstream risk-neutral retailer in a three stages supply chain model is designed and modeled in order to study the mutual influence of risk-controlling and benefit-sharing on the cooperation of supply chain partners. As a result, the restriction of Downside-Risk is satisfied and revenue of each other is increased. We can draw a conclusion that the supply chain can be better coordinated and more profit can be produced when the supply chain cooperation contract is designed efficiently and the risk-neutral provide initiatively the risk-averse with necessary risk protecting to satisfy its restriction of risk.3. Starting from the practical background, the dissertation utilizes game theory, mainly Stackelberg game and Rubinstein bargaining game, to analyze the impact on supply chain coordination by outside force intervening. Considering a model comprising many producers and few retail oligarchs as the research object, the dissertation proves that individual pricing is not optimal and improvement space exists. This transaction model firstly can not achieve to maximize social welfare, and even more is bad for manufacturers developing and becoming more powerful as well as national industry development. In order to change this bad equilibrium and seek Pareto improvement, the intervening and regulating by the government seems very important and necessary.In the end, the future research direction is pointed out, which can be included as quantifying the framework of supply chain coordination mechanism and studying the measurement as well as sensitivity on the force by government for pursuing the goal of profits Pareto improvement.