A Study On Supply Chain Game And Coordination Based On Supply Chain Contract

Because supply chain (SC) members are independent enterprises, they make decisions to optimize their own local objectives. In order that the enterprises'behavior aligned with the optimal actions of the SC system, it is necessary to design appropriate incentive mechanism to restrain and coordinate the entities on the SC. The literature of SC management applies SC contracts as an effective managing tool to control incentive conflicts and improve the SC performance. The study of SC enterprises'game and cooperation problems from perspective of SC coordination stemmed from SC management in reality to reach win-win is an important research area of SC contract.In this dissertation the SC coordination problems based on SC contract about SC member's asymmetric information and risk-averse, inventory and pricing decision, local advertising and ordering, SC innovation investment in globalized and decentralized SC circumstance are studied through quantitative modeling and analyzing. The main contents could be summarized as follows:By adopting theories of SC and principal agent theory of Information Economics, the problem about how a supplier to design a supply contract when there exists retailer's moral hazard about his sale effort is studied. The contracts of decreasing information rent and being more efficient for the SC are analyzed. And also, a downside-risk-averse supplier'capacity reservation decision model under stochastic demand is investigated, and the SC performance with such a participant is analyzed. Moreover, a SC coordination model and policy under this circumstance are proposed. The SC coordination contracts based on inventory and pricing with price dependent demand are analyzed and summarized. After the demands from downstream enterprises are divided into two kinds: deterministic demands and stochastic demands according to product character, the research has compared the SC coordination contracts in these two scenarios. A Stackelberg game model where the manufacturer acts as a Stackelberg leader and transshipment occurs among retailers via secondary market is further studied. The local advertising input and order policy coordination of SC with retailers'non-price competing (advertising) is considered. And the SC coordination models under both single retailer and multiple competing retailers are proposed. Then the contracts to coordinate the SC are studied, and the results are verified by numerical example. To promote the coordination and overall performance of SC, a SC game model about upstream innovation investment to decrease operating costs under price-sensitivity demand is constructed. Firstly, the research studies the single retailer scenario, and shows that market character, leadership of SC and reserve profits of upstream enterprise all have great influence on upstream innovation input. The profits of SC among different market character are compared. The SC contracts of innovation input that coordinates the whole SC made by different leaders are proposed. Then by using a Stackelberg game model, two competing heterogeneous retailers scenario is considered. The research illustrates that the innovation investment creates vertical externality within the channel, and the more retailers'competition intensity, the more the manufacturer will invest. The research also shows that the decentralized decision cannot coordinate the SC innovation investment. A compound contract of SC coordination based on quantity-discount schedule is proposed and the conditions that are feasible to all supply chain members are pointed out.