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Asymmetric Risk Appetite, Supply Chain Coordination Incentive

Posted on:2008-02-05Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J ZhangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2199360215498072Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Supply chain consists of multiple enterprises which make decisions independently, and further each enterprise is controlled by human whose subjective and the attitude about risk can influent the decisions, so it is great significant to consider the decision-maker's risk attitude in research the incentive problems of supply chain coordination.This paper first reviews the literatures about supply chain coordination and shows the disadvantages, then, discusses the two problems as follows considering the decision-maker's risk attitude:System coordination model research with down-stream enterprise implementing incentive mechanism: this research first analyzes the influence of the uncertain of supplier's supply commodities, then discusses the creditable optimal order-meeting-rate(in one supplier-one purchaser system for simplifying the model ) with the supply chain facing large lot or contingent demand which must be delivered in short time, but the risk-averse supplier having limit capability, and the manufacturer which is the supply chain's down-stream enterprise implementing a contract incentive, further, analyzes the influence of the supplier's risk-averse attitude on the supply chain's decisions.System coordination model research with up-stream enterprise implementing incentive mechanism: in the supply chain that one supplier uses buyback contract and multiple identical loss-averse buyers compete with each other, this paper establishes supplier's and buyers' expect utility under decentralized decision system, analyzes the model's optimization, and researches the supply chain coordination problems, finally, analyzes the relationships between buyback contract and buyers' loss-averse degree, expect utility of the bilateral participator.The results of this paper can complement the supply chain coordination research considering decision-maker's risk attitude, and also be effective to support decision-maker to set incentive mechanisms or respondto the incentive.
Keywords/Search Tags:risk preference, supply chain coordination, contract incentive mechanism, order fill rate, loss averse
PDF Full Text Request
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