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Results On The Extension Of The Stackelberg Game Model

Posted on:2009-08-07Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L P MengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360245994823Subject:Operational Research and Cybernetics
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With the ever-changing contemporary wave of high-tech development and the promotion of the process of economic globalization, China's economy is gradually integrated with the world economy. The competitive environment which China's enterprises faces has been changing from relatively stable, predictable, static and controlled environment in the past to rapid oscillation, dynamic and unpredictable, confrontational strongly and almost uncontrollable environment now. Analysis of the enterprises competition should not stick to static analysis. Enterprises must adjust their strategies and actions based on the reaction and possible opponents reactions constantly. It is a urgent problem to solve that how to find an efficient method to analysis this dynamic environment.Game theory is to study the rational decision-making of the players which are interdependent and mutual influential, as well as the results of the equilibriums. In the equilibriums, every player's utility function depends not only on his own strategy, but also on other players' strategies. Therefore game theory studies a matter of individual choice around which is a mutual external economic conditions. After decades of rapid development, game theory has made tremendous achievements both in theoretical research and in applied research. As an effective tool for the analysis of the dynamic, the classic Stackelberg model has been a great development.The results of the static game theory model are introduced to its dynamic model. The extended Stackelberg could better meet the requirements of the modern market, and guide modern enterprise's competitiveness in a more practical significance. Mainly in the following two aspects:1. Introduce capacity constraints to the Stackelberg model, and study a price Stackelberg game model in a homogeneous product market. Two identical firms, which are limited by capacity constraints, compete with price as their strategic variable, and an efficient rationing rule is adopted. There is a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in which the two firms quote the same prices. In certain capacity range, there is a second mover advantage. In addition, we analyze an asymmetric case and find the second mover advantage still exists.2. Use the result of the static model, and investigating that in a differentiated market, two firms can make only two types of contracts, the price contract and the quantity contract, and play a Stackelberg-like game. The equilibrium is that one will choose quantity contract(price contract) if the goods are substitutes(complements) no matter its the leader or the follower. And we compare the prices, quantities and profits of the two firms under different circumstances.
Keywords/Search Tags:Stackelberg, capacity constrains, substitutes, price, quantity
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