Research On Contracts Design Of Supply Chain With Demand Uncertainty Considering Capacity

Along with market competition intensifying,personalized consumer ap-pears in succession,then the uncertainty of consumer demand for products is becoming bigger and bigger.This kind of uncertainty is mainly manifested in the fluctuation of product demand and the change of price,as well as the contingency in production and supply chain,which makes the enterprises in the whole supply chain face certain risks.In order to solve this problem,this dissertation starts from three aspects.Firstly,to consider the pricing and or-dering strategies under the limited capacity of the supply chain.Secondly,to study the pricing and ordering strategies when the manufacturer carries out rebate promotions when there is overcapacity in supply chain.In addition,to consider the strategies of pricing and scale of production in the make-to-order supply chain.The research problems and main conclusions of this dissertation are summarized as follows:(1)We first consider a supply chain with a revenue-sharing contract that includes a manufacturer with limited production capacity and n retailers who order specific products from the manufacturer.There is a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the retailer,in which the manufacturer,acts as a leader,has a first-move advantage and will provide a revenue-sharing contract,while the retailer,acts as the follower,will determine their own optimal pricing and ordering strategies according to the contract offered by the manufacturer.It is proved that there is a unique optimal revenue sharing ratio when one of the following two conditions is satisfied:1)all different,kinds of goods have the same price elasticity coefficient,and 2)the price elasticity coefficient of all kinds of goods does not exceed 2.By comparing centralized and decentralized systems,we find that at least one retailer’s retail price(or order quantity)in decentralized system is lower(or higher)than that of in centralized system,when both systems have capacity constraints.In addition,we found that the potential cost of punishment exists in the centralized system,when there are capacity constraints’ and this kind of punishment does not exist in the decentralised system.This is because the revenue sharing ratio can be used to adjust the retailer’s orders to make it meet the manufacturer’s capacity constraint in the decentralised system,it turns out that the total profits in decentralised system is greater than that of in centralised system.(2)A supply chain under rebate promotion with revenue sharing and w-holesale price contracts is studied,and the product demand function in the supply chain depends on both retail price and the face value of manufacturer’s rebate.There is a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the re-tailer,in which the manufacturer,acts as s leader,has a first-move advantage and provides a contract including the face value of rebate and revenue sharing ratio(or wholesale price),while the retailer,acts as a follower,determines his optimal pricing and ordering strategies according to the contract.We obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium solution of the supply chain under each contract,and find the sufficient conditions to achieve Pareto improvement under the revenue sharing and wholesale price contracts,respectively,that is,the manu-facturer and retailer obtain higher expected profits under different contracts,compared with the situation without the rebate strategy.More importantly,we also find a sufficient condition to achieve Karldor-Hicks improvement,that is,the expected profit of the manufacturer in the supply chain under revenue sharing contract with rebate promotion is higher than that of without rebate promotion,the expected profit of the retailer is lower,and the total profit is higher.Furthermore,we find that the revenue sharing contract with rebate promotion can achieve a Karldor-Hicks improvement over the wholesale price contract with rebate promotion.(3)We finally study a make-to-order supply chain,which consists of single retailer and single manufacturer,and operates in multiple periods and faces demand uncertainty.Due to the lack of funds of the manufacturer before the selling season,retailers are going to participate in the production line.In the first case,when the manufacturer organizes his own production,the manufac-turer provides the retailer a contract that includes the wholesale price of the product and the number of periods,under which the retailer determines the retail price of the product and the quantity of the order.The manufacturer,in turn,determines the scale of production according to the retailer’s order quantity.In the second case,when the manufacturer leases the production line to the retailer and the retailer organizes the production,the manufacturer provides the retailer a contract that includes the leasing fee(per production scale)and the number of periods,the retailer then determines the retail price and the production quantity according to the contract.We study two con-tracts,the first one is N-period contract,that is,the relationship between the retailer and the manufacturer maintain N periods,the second one is long-term contract,i.e.N→∞.We analyze the two types of contracts,obtain the e-quilibrium solution of the supply chain under the two contracts,and find that the per-period expected profit of the retailer,the manufacturer and the supply chain are all increasing in the number of periods N.In this dissertation,the previous studies on supply chain pricing and or-dering strategies have been expanded and improved in the aspects of capacity limitation,promotion activities and make-to-order,which have important the-oretical significance.Restricted by limited capacity,it is common for suppliers to fail to meet orders from retailers.This research provides a theoretical foun-dation for enterprises.In addition,in case of overcapacity or launching new product,sale promotion is an indispensable part in order to reduce inventory or quickly seize new market share.The research on the pricing and ordering strategy of supply chain based on the rebate promotion activity has important practical guiding significance for the production and operation of enterpris-es.In addition,the research on the supply chain based on make-to-order can largely avoid overcapacity or shortage.It can not only avoid the waste of re-sources but also respond to the market demand quickly and effectively,which has certain guiding significance in the manufacturing industry.