The Research On The Fund Managers' Optimal Incentive Contract And Supervision Mechanism

Reviewing the modern financial history, securities investment funds, with its advantages of the operation system in the,has a rapid rise in the world financial markets, it has become an important force in the stock market. However, because the fund investors and managers have the principal-agent relationship ,under the condition of the information asymmetry, the fund managers are likely to pursue their own utilities maximization ,so it may has the moral hazard problem, this would damage the interests of investors. Currently, ,how to solve the moral hazard problem of the fund managers has become importantly to the healthy development of investment funds.This paper firstly analyzed the fund system, described the concept, organization structure and characteristics of the investment funds in detail, and introduced the history and status of development fund. the fund manager moral hazard is introduced, the causes are analyzed in detail, then points out the objective facts of the fund manager moral hazard . Secondly, the paper selected 21 funds, and had an empirical analysis of the compensations of the fund managers, then compared the two incentive contracts , and pointed out the shortages of the current incentive contracts, they can't play a positive incentive effect. Thirdly, according to this problems, the paper established the relative performance of fund managers incentive model, and through the solving and comparison , verifies the relative performance standards in the theoretical level: (1) The introduction of contract can improve the agent relationship of the fund incentive contracts. (2) The relative performance standards can not only improve the strength of incentive effect of the fund managers, but also reduce the risk of the fund investors. (3) Relative performance indicators can provide more informations about the action election of the fund manager ,it is very meaningful for implementing supervision to the fund managers. Finally, on the basis of theoretical analysis, the paper puts forward a proposal for the foundation of incentive mechanism which should be linked with the evaluation performance system, establish the scientific performance evaluation system, so as to design an effective incentive mechanism.In the way of the fund supervision, this paper puts forward the investment fund should be perfected, to strengthen the construction of legal system, strengthen internal fund information disclosure supervision and social supervision by public opinion, vigorously develop the open-end fund, etc.It should create a good environment for the specification development of the fund .