An Empirical Study On Controlling Shareholders' Tunneling Under Different Reorganization Modes

The phenomenon of controlling shareholder's fund embezzlement of listed company is very serious and widespread,which has become a major problem of the development of stock market. Using a sample of 1998-2001 China's 227 state-owned enterprises after the initial public offering three years of data,empirical studies found that the higher the degree of controlling shareholder's fund embezzlement and its capital,the lower the market value,so it proves that controlling shareholders'fund embezzlement is a way of tunneling. It shows that small and medium-sized shareholders will take the stock that the degree of controlling shareholders'fund embezzlement of listed company is serious at a discount in order to protect its own interests. Second, the introduction of reform model variables affect the positive test occurred in the controlling shareholder funds of funds to carry out their acts of occupation of the degree of occupiers of the main factors. Empirical studies the main factors that effect the controlling shareholders'fund embezzlement and in which the degree on occupy through reorganization model.Related research from the point of view on the corporate governance mechanisms, such as ownership structure,this paper analyze it from point of view on the joint-stock system reform model which used before state-owned enterprises listed on,in order to identify the deep-seated reasons for the system of the controlling shareholders'embezzlement of listed company.While inspecting the impact of the controlling shareholders'fund embezzlement of listed companies ,we found that incomplete reorganization have a higher probability and degree of controlling shareholders'fund embezzlement problem than those SOEs that went through more complete reorganizations.While inspecting the factors which ownership structure and reorganization mode make on the fund embezzlement,we found that reorganization mode is the main factor , the relationship between ownership structure and embezzlement is no longer significant. It shows that the problem of controlling shareholder's fund embezzlement of listed company is that SOEs reorganization mode is not complete to a large extent. In study the factor which control group reorganization mode makes on fund embezzlement , we found company both in incomplete reorganization or complete reorganization,the listed companies which controlled by the group have embezzlement and the degree of occupiers are significantly higher than the non-control group of listed companies. It shows that at this stage,the problem of tunneling under the group's control mode is more serious and overwhelming its inherent efficiency advantage. In this paper,the conclusions of the study further confirm the meaning of the overall reorganization of SOEs on list , and provide policy recommendations for government on how to reform strategy and way of the overall reorganization.