The Research Of Controlling Shareholders' Tunneling Behavior And Disposing Suggestions In China

As the research in the field of Corporate Governances deepens, the role of controlling shareholder has attracted more attention, the core issue in corporate governances has been shifted to the question that how to deal with the agent Problem between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders. Private Benefits of Control (PBC) is the key of this Problem.The phenomenon of majority shareholders and group members Expropriating listed companies'funds is prevalent in China's stock market. The behavior that majority shareholders expropriate listed companies'fund is a kind of "tunneling" which refers to the act that controlling shareholders transfer the listed companies properties or profits out for their own benefits. Controls the shareholder to pull out the white line is always exists for this question, our country like this various aspects supervise and manage not the perfect country in particular. Surges upward in the market, the optimistic mood which exists generally is covered, but is murky in the market, has extremely possibly highlights, moreover creates consequence unusual serious. The article is conducted to restrict behavior of "controlling shareholder and protect of the minority shareholders and creditors.This article is divided into five parts. Part I is theory of economics and document. Part II is the research of controlling shareholders'behavior and the theoretical analysis of Private Benefits of Control. PartⅢanalysis controlling shareholders'behavior of listed companies of Chinese, and presents many evidences to prove that the controlling shareholders do expropriations. PartⅣenumerated has controlled the shareholder to violate young shareholder benefit several main ways. The Part V provides a collection of measures abort controlling shareholders'behavior of "tunneling".