The Empirical Research Of Agency Problem In The Family Company With Stock Pyramid

China's private economy,after more than 20 years of development,has been the formation of a group of considerable size and strength of family groups of enterprises, some of which are family businesses in the industry was a monopoly.Thus,the study of family business-agent problem,pointing out that the existence of the possible conflict of interest,you can better promote my family business and the sound development of private economy.In this paper,the issue of family business ownership structure of control rights and cash flow requirements of the separation of agency costs on to explore the impact and provide empirical evidence.In theory,the controlling family shareholders,stock pyramid through the formation of enterprise groups,the use of stock pyramid to control the family can be controlled enterprises in the enterprise cash flow rights and control over the separation,the bottom of the pyramid form of absolute control over the enterprise,and the corresponding title is very little.This kind of special "majority stockholder" phenomenon may lead to a series of agency problem.At the same time, controlling shareholders of family-controlled enterprises and arbitrary allocation of resources may lead to the ownership levels of the agency problem,so that the interests of small shareholders suffered.Thus,compared with the general public, family-controlled enterprise with an enterprise value of the relationship between the more complex.Through empirical research,we come to the following conclusions:(1) With the family(or natural person) on the control of family business and cash flow of the separation of powers,the performance of family businesses from the more severe the agency problem;(2) With the family(or natural person) of the family business, control of cash flow and the separation of the right to the family business in the family business,the more inclined to establish internal capital markets;(3) cash flow as a major shareholder the right to increase its economic benefits have also increased,thus the majority shareholder for the protection of investment management is also enhanced supervision;(4) With the increase of the ratio of asset and liability,agency problems but didn't have the so-called "supervision" function,instead of enhance the agency problems in family company.According to the phenomenon,this article from the strengthening of the protection of the rights of small shareholders to restrict the controlling shareholder the right to absolute control,as well as improve the corporate governance structure of listed companies and strengthen the power of the external monitor,etc.were proposed.