Research On Demanding Information-sharing Mechanism Of Supply Chain For Innovative Perishable Goods

Market demand has been more difficulty to forecast and changes faster with the development of technology and economic progress. The various enterprises are facing more severe market environment. The paper mainly focus on the coordinate of the member in supply chain. The reseach of this paper is set in perishable products,such as Fashionable dress and Electronic product . The paper try to chase down the reason of information asymmetry in the supply chain of innovative perishable products. At mechanism design angle, the paper attempt at the solution of the problem of information asymmetry in the supply chain by mechanism design from manufacturer.At the beginning, the paper set forth the character of innovative perishable products and it's supply chain, and point out that the downstream firms of the supply chain has more precise information than the upstream firms. The paper study the problem of information asymmetry in the supply chain of innovative perishable products by setting up a two-echelon supply chain model that include only one manufacturer and retailer. Comparison of the optimal decision and maximization of profit that manufacturer and retailer get under information asymmetry and free sharing of information, then analyse the market behaviour and market performance of the manufacturer and retailer. We can find out that free sharing of information will bring down the market performance of retailer and the gross market performance of supply chain. So the railer will not share the information for free. The paper also prove out that the information asymmetries will bring down the market performance of manufacturer. In order to tackle the problem of information asymmetries, the manufacturer design a mechanism of price discounts. It expects to actuate that retailers transmit it'sprivate information by preisnachlass . Base on the different discounts form, the paper divided the mechanism of price discounts into three different types: I. The price discounts mechanism of the total amount. II. The mechanisms of linear quantity discounts. III. The mechanisms of nonlinear quantity discounts. Solving Stackelberg equilibrium of the manufacturer and retailer under three mechanisms, and analysis of the mechanism with the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constrain. The paper summarize that the mechanisms of linear quantity discounts and the mechanisms of nonlinear quantity discounts can lead to information sharing and supply chain coordination at a specific condition. Though the mechanisms can achieve the purpose, there are different optimal decisions of the manufacturer and retailer under different mechanisms. By comparing the manufacturer's profit and the gross profit of supply chain under the different mechanisms, it occurs that even though both of the mechanisms can lead to information sharing and supply chain coordination, but two mechanisms have a lot of different effects: Under the mechanisms of linear quantity discounts, manufacturer has to pay more for the information sharing. However, because of its allocation of risks with retailer, which bring more improvement in the gross profit of supply chain. The mechanisms of linear quantity discounts is top efficiency mechanisms. Under the mechanisms of nonlinear quantity discounts, manufacturer's information costs are lower, it can make sure that the market performance of manufacturer improve more. At the end of the paper, its analysis of the mechanism selection which is made by the manufacturer under different purposes.