| With modern company system established, the efficiency of company operating is increased greatly. Company governance, as the core of modern enterprise system, in which plays an important role. In company governance, how to solve the problem of agency entrusted between shareholders and managers has been the focus of world's studying .The equity-based incentive, which gets the interests together between the shareholders and managers, and reduces the principal-agent problem effectively. In the developed countries, the equity-based incentive as the core of company governance is applied by many companies, and contributes to improve the companies for their business efficiency and competitiveness. With the establishment of a modern enterprise system in our own country, the equity-based incentive was begun to apply. However, due to the different condition of our country, the imperfect market and legal system; in addition, the stock ownership incentive in China is not a long time of practice. Lots of company copied the developed country directly in incentive designed, Considering the less characteristics of Chinese market, the effect of equity-based incentive was weakly and deviated from its original intention. This paper will analyses the condition of stock ownership incentive and incentive effect in our country in present, mainly through the research of the equity-based incentive operating performance and shareholder returns after the share-trading reform of listed companies implementing in our country. Then combining with actual implementation effect, analyzes the reasons. Further analyses the factors which affects the efficiency of the implementation in the equity-based incentive, including the enterprise external environment and internal factors. On this basis, combining the characteristics of the stock ownership incentive, design the option incentive mode for the actual situation in our country is in order to improve the efficiency of the equity-based incentive of listed companies. |
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