The Experimental Research Of Auction Mechanism Of The Initial Emission Rights

With the development of economic,environmental pollution has become increasingly serious.Since the 20th century,all countries in the world have taken a variety of environmental management measures to alleviate environmental problems.The most international concern is the initial allocation of emission rights.In practice,the United States put forward three kinds of modes of distribution:free distribution,sale and public auction.Using free allocation to distribute the initial emission rights has an unfair and less reasonable features,using the sale price may be unfair,while the auction is a market transactions which has a long history Its characteristic of openness,fairness and impartiality win the recognition of the two sides of market trading and general public,and many economists think that the auction of initial emission rights has an extremely important significance on the implementation of emissions trading.As a new market-oriented economic instruments for environmental management,the domestic theory filed start the research of the theory and practice of the initial emission trading system late.In particular,the approach to research using experimental economics is even less.This article focuses on the static auction of initial emission rights:Uniform price sealed-bid auction, Discriminatory price auction and Vickrey auction;dynamic auction:Ascending clock auction and Clock agent auction;and analyze the bidding strategy.According to research methods of experimental economics,I have designed four auction experiments:the experiment of Uniform price sealed-bid auction,the experiments of Discrimination price auction,the experiments of Vickrey auction and Ascending clock auction. Through the experiments of 16 sections which have total 160 hours,draw some important data of initial emission rights. Again using the auction efficiency of initial emission rights, the revenue of the buyers and the sellers,the quantities of auction as the parameters,using the buyer's valuation distribution:normal distribution and uniform distribution, the number of the auction and auction mode as the factors, analyzing and comparing the parameters above.By comparing the results obtained in the static auction,we get the result that Uniform price sealed-bid auction is the optimal auction;and dynamic auction is superior to static auction.Finally, according the actual situation of our country,China's auction of initial emission rights,Ascending clock auction is the best.