The Research Of Supply Chain Contract With The Participants Having Different Risk Preference

With the rapid scientific and economic development nowadays, competition between companies has become fast and furious. The enterprises involved in supply chains are separate economic entities, so the problems of multi-marginalization occurred in cooperation have increased considerable difficulties in supply chains; At the same time, the complexity of the supply chain network, instability of the external environment and over pursuit of lean production have all lead to the different risk preferences of supplying chain companies in decision making. So the supplying chain contract, which takes into account the risk preference in decision making by the companies, has become the key in providing coordination in real world practice. So after a rigorous literature review, the models of supply chain contract(wholesaling contract model, revenue-sharing contract)which takes into account the different risk preferences in different enterprises to solve new problems in supply chain management are established, followed by a discussion of correspondent supply chain's coordinability.The work done in this thesis mainly includes:1.After an extensive literature review of relevant models inland and abroad, including newsvendor model, wholesaling contract and revenue-sharing contract as well as extended studies which incorporates the decision maker's risk,the inadequacy in current research which needs to be tackled is exposured and the paper's research direction is pointed out.2. The wholesaling contract model which incorporates the participating companies' different risk preferences in supply chains is builded. Firstly in this part of research, a description of the decision making functions and the type of preferences they depict as the foundation of this study is given. Then the supplier decision model, the wholesaler decision model and integrated supply chain decision model,all of which are built under the wholesaling contract and taking into account of different risk preferences, are established. Then the impact of risk preference types is discussed. Last the bilateral marginalization effect of supply chain is discussed. The motivation mechanism of the supply chain doesn't be considered in this chapter, insteadly the decision optimization in a non-cooperative state between suppliers and wholesalers,which serves as the foundation of quantification in the following chapters, is discussed.3. The revenue-sharing contract model which the participating companies have different risk preferences in supply chains is buildt. The classic revenue-sharing contract model can coordinate the supply chain with the objective of profit maximization, however, after risk preference is considered this model no longer works. So, on the basis of the previous chapters' work, firstly the classic revenue-sharing contract model being incoordination is proved after the decision makers' risk preferences are considered. Then the suppliers decision model, wholesalers decision model and integrated supply chain model, all of which are built under the revenue-sharing contract and their different risk preferences are considered, are built. Last the coordination of the supplying chain is discussed and a coordination strategy which can express different risk prefernences is given.4. The numerical analysises and simulations based on all of the above models are undertaked. Wholesaling contract model under different decision makers' preferences and revenue-sharing model are analyzed through simulation and the results validate our conclusion.