The Study Of The Effects Of The Equity Incentive On The Listed Companies' Information Disclosure Level

As an effective way to solve agent question and decrease the cost of agent, equity incentive has significantly improved the companies'core competition and boosted the development of economy in western countries. However, the practice of equity incentive in western countries demonstrates that equity incentive is a"two-edged sword": it gets active effects of long-term incentive in suitable condition, otherwise, it brings with some new moral hazard and produces some negative effects. In our country, it has become the consensus and policy orientation that using equity incentive to inspirit top managers in recent years. With the fall of non-tradable shares reform and related measures gradually forming, equity incentive has been received more and more focused. So, it is necessary to recognize the effects of equity incentive objectively when the equity incentive plan is being implemented in a large scale.This paper does a systematic summaries and combing on theories and literatures of the equity incentives and the information disclosure first, and then I build a static game model to research the intrinsic mechanism of equity incentive and information disclosure. Based on this study, this paper does an empirical research on the information disclosure level in the equity incentives process of listed company by using panel data.According to the empirical research, we found that: equity incentive has a negative correlation with information disclosure level, but, the coefficient of equity incentive is insignificant in the regression equation, the reason may be is that the magnitude of equity incentive was low. At one time, we also found that: LNSIZE and ROE have positive correlation with information disclosure level; PREC and PO have negative correlation with information disclosure level; INDE, AUDI and LEV have nothing to do with information disclosure level.