| Information disclosure of listed companies is the ties and bridges that link the supply side and the demand side. Company information disclosure level of quality is directly related to the decision-making of investors and other stakeholders. Therefore, improve information disclosure quality has important significance. Compared with western countries, china’s securities market started lately, information disclosure of listed companies has many problems, information disclosure quality is still relatively low. Therefore, finding the impact factor of the quality of information disclosure of listed companies in China, improving the quality of information disclosure factors and lead to information disclosure lower quality factors to be controlled are our problem to be solved. Management as the company’s decision-making and executive body, its behavior can have a major impact in all aspects of day-to-day operations of the company. The management who has the content and mode are able to develop operational control, resolution of the company’s accounting information. It directly affects the quantity and quality of accounting information. At the same time, modern corporate design a monetary reward incentive, equity incentive and control over the incentive management incentives, which try to alleviate the agency problem between owners and managers. Therefore, by examining a variety of management incentives with what kind of impact the quality of information disclosure of listed companies to achieve the desired effect, to help policy-makers who better improve management incentives, to further improve the corporate governance structure, thus making the quality of information disclosure of listed companies can be improved, but also conducive to the various stakeholders to better decision-making.My studying is management incentives affecting the quality of information disclosure of listed companies. In order to achieve the research purpose, first of all, the management incentive impact on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies related literature review and simple comments, then introduces the theoretical basis of management incentives impact on the quality of information disclosure. On this basis,1put forward the four assumptions. The dependent variable are IDQ, independent variables are TS、DIR3、SM3、MSR、△MR、P1、 P2、P3、TMI, control variables are S1、LNS、ROE and DBET. The article establish nine regression models, the article has descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and ordered the logistic analysis. Finally, the conclusions drawn in this article and make recommendations. Through the establishment of the model, select the2008—2010three-year data for the empirical analysis, the main conclusions of this paper is as follows:(1)Management of monetary reward incentives has a positive impact on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies. In the empirical test, the more management annual pay, the better the quality of information disclosure; the higher the top three directors, the better the quality of information disclosure; the higher the top three executives pay, the better the quality of information disclosure. Therefore, it improves the company’s quality of information disclosure by effective management of the implementation of monetary reward incentive.(2)Management equity incentive has a negative impact on the quality of information disclosure of listed companies.In the empirical test, the higher proportion of managerial ownership, the lower quality of information disclosure, the greater management shareholders adding-value, the lower quality of information disclosure. Implementation of equity incentive management reduces the quality of information disclosure.(3)Management who controls over the incentive has a negative impact on the quality of disclosure of company information. In the control over the incentive model, although the term quality don’t significantly affect the company’s information disclosure, But two jobs-one, the independence of the quality of corporate information disclosure is negative, and significant at the5%level. It show that management of listed companies in China the right incentives reduces the quality of information disclosure.(4)Management incentives for listed companies don’t affect the quality of information disclosure. In the empirical test, composite indicator don’t pass the significance test, that’s to say, management incentives don’t have impact on quality of information disclosure of listed companies. (5)In the control variables.ownership concentration and quality of information disclosure have a significant positive correlation in the1%level, it show that the higher degree of ownership concentration of listed companies, the higher quality of information disclosure that supports the governance role played by the concentration of ownership. The size and quality of information disclosure has a significant positive correlation in the1%level. It show that large-scale listed companies are often subject to a high degree of attention and supervision. Their internal control system and information disclosure system is more comprehensive and higher quality of information disclosed than the generally small-scale companies, The level of corporate earnings and information disclosure quality have significantly positive correlation. It explains that the better performance of the company hope the public will see them good business. It’s always willing to disclose more and better information. Corporate leverage and the quality of information disclosure have the negative correlation significantly in the1%level. It show that the higher debt ratio of listed companies, the more financial risk. compared to companies of the low liabilities, it’s more inclined to run into financial difficulties. Management is more likely to manipulate the disclosure of information that results in lower quality of information disclosure.The main contribution of this paper is as follows:(1)At present, the research on the control of the incentive for theoretical research, this article into the information and control over the incentives to disclose the scope of the study of the factors affecting the quality, has a very important practical significance. At the same time, in this paper, combined with the monetary reward incentive, equity incentive and control of incentives, management incentive composite indicator constructed by factor analysis, it comprehensively surveys management incentives on the quality of information disclosure.(2)In order to better reflect quality of information disclosure changes of the past10years, in this paper, the quality of information disclosure of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange main board listed company conduct an annual evaluation analysis and the annual average analysis. We hope that it more intuitive reveal the status of the quality of information disclosure in China. (3)In terms of model selection, using the Ordered Logistic regression model avoids the ordinary logistic model requires the quality of information disclosure simple that divides into two in order to make variables to meet the drawbacks of the binomial distribution. The Ordered Logistic regression modeling make empirical test more comprehensive and also make the empirical results better to reflect the true situation.Shortages of this paper are as follows:(1)Insufficient sample size. In this paper, the listed companies’ information disclosure quality alternative to variable selection to select only the Shenzhen Stock Exchange main board listed companies with evaluation of the results of sample inspection, there is no such evaluation mechanism in the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Therefore, the scope of the study are limited, the study sample size did not cover all the A-share listed company.(2)In the motivate measure of control over the selection, the measure of it in this article are not sufficiently precise. Control over the incentive is still relatively small, its measurement already has a certain difficulty. Related data is also more difficult to obtain. Therefore, we use a less accurate alternative indicators. |
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