The Effects Of The Equity Incentive On The Listed Companies’ Acconting Information Disclosure Quality

Equity incentives plays an important part in the development of the listed companies in China, because it effectively decreases agent cost.However, the practice of equity incentive demonstrates that the equity incentive is a "double-edged sword" from home and abroad as well. If it be applied properly, we will get active effects of long-term incentive; otherwise, it will bring some new moral risk and generates some negative effects. In China, with the fall of non-tradable shares reform and related measures gradually being opposed, equity incentive has been played more and more attention to. So, it is necessary to recognize the effectiveness of equity incentive clearly when the equity incentive will being implemented by many listed companies.This thesis chooses405enterprises going on Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The author of the paper takes steps for the research. First, accounting information disclosure quality level of304enterprises which have applied equity incentive is compared with that of101companies which have not implemented yet to draw a new conclusion. Second, test the correlation between equity incentive and accounting information disclosure equality of companies on ShenZhen Stock Exchange. At last demonstrates that state-ownered controlling persons of enterprises make a profound impact on the correlation between them above.Through empirical study, this article findings shows that the averages of accounting information disclosure equality vary significantly between two groups of enterprises.One group have applied equity incentive,yet the other group have not. There is positive correlation between equity incentive and accounting information disclosure equality. However, when companies are controlled by state-ownered stockholders, the means do not seem differently, and the positive correlation does not exist at all. But if enterprise does not include state-holding, the situation is exactly opposite.