Research On The Ownership Balance Of China's Listed Banks

In modern corporate governance, in addition to the agent conflict between the shareholders and professional managers, actually there is another serious one, which is existed between large shareholders and external scattered minority shareholders. This agent conflict is particularly serious in the Chinese Securities Market, which was developed under the special economic background. The harming behavior of large shareholders to the listed companies and minority shareholders has become a chronic disease, as the immediate consequence is not only seriously disserving the survival and development of listed companies, but also restricting the healthy development of the securities market and threatening the financial security.Listed banks play a very important role in modern economy. Therefore, how to effectively restrain the harming behavior of large shareholders, and make them responsibility, has become a new problem in theoretical studies on corporate governance.The foreign researches on the theory of ownership balance have provided a useful inspiration to solve this dilemma. This paper discusses the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance of Chinese listed banks which belong to Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchange of 2007 based on academic research and empirical research.This paper intends to make an approach to the restricted effect by systematic studying on the relationship between the ownership-balance structure and corporate value. It also tries to find a reasonable form of ownership-balance structure in order to lay a theoretical foundation and put forward some policy recommendations to solve the chronic disease and improve the corporate governance of our listed companies.Based on a review of studies around the world, this paper theoretically analyses the relationship between the ownership-balance structure and corporate performance, then it empirically examines the results of the theoretical analysis by using the raw data of our listed banks. The results of empirical examination show that there is a cube-relation between the shares held by the largest shareholder and the bank's performance. It's also proved that the sum squares affect the banks' performance in square level. Finally, the paper provides four countermeasures for building the balance of ownership structure in banking of our country.