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An Empirical Study On The Relation Of Shareholder Structure With Power Balance And Corporate Performance

Posted on:2010-12-13Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:D Y LuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360302459880Subject:Business management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Ownership structure is a very important component of the structure of corporate governance in the listed companies,and the reasonable ownership structure would be more effective in promoting the perfection of the structure of governance, the improvement of management efficiency and corporate performance.In the corporate governance, principal-agent conflict exists not only between the shareholders and the professional managers , also between the major shareholders and the medium-sized and small shareholders in companies. How to solve the two types of principal-agent problem in the corporate governance, and the establishment of a reasonable governance institutions is the key to improve the performance.In this paper, we try to find a reasonable shareholder structure with power balance by the empirical research of the relationship between the power balance of shareholder and the corporate performance in order to provide a theoretical basis for solving the invasion of benefits from the major stockholder in the securities market and improving the governance of listed companies in our country.Based on the 2002 to 2004 datas of the listed manufacturing companies from the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges, the paper makes an empirical study on the influence of the power balance of shareholder structure on corporate performance on the basis of the former study. In the course of the study of the both relations, we selected the returns ratio of total assets as the index to evaluate the corporate performance. The results show that the corporate operating performance improve with the increase of the proportion of the shares of the second largest shareholder and the decrease of the gap of the first and second largest shareholders in the non-absolutely-holding listed companies apparently. We divided the samples into two categories according to the proportion of 10% stocks taken by the second major stockholder,and the study shows that the performance of the two categories of companies has significant difference through independent samples T-test,and the share of 10% as the threshold of balance shareholders is a good choice. The study also shows that the number of balance shareholders is a positive correlation to the corporate performance. The performance in the companies with different nature between the two major shareholders is slightly higher than them with the same nature, but it failed to pass the test of significance. In accordance with the empirical results, this paper puts forward the following proposals, such as a number of ways selected to reduce the proportion of shares owned by the controlling shareholder,and consolidate and expand the achievements in the reform of split share structure,and vigorously develop institutional investors,and strengthen the rule of law and the capital market system and so on.
Keywords/Search Tags:The balance system of stockholder's rights, the nature of shareholder, Corporate performance
PDF Full Text Request
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