The Studies Of Stockholder's Rights Drive For Management In China

The last century, stockholder's rights drive in the United States began to sprout in the next 20 years, experienced a rapid development, has become bound by the management staff incentives to create value for the enterprise as an important model, and even the global economy development have had a profound impact. Especially in Europe and the United States and other well-developed areas, equity-based incentives has become one of the effective options which can solve agent-problems, helping to eliminate the shareholders and the divergence of interests between manager, thereby building a solid community of interest.The ownership and management will be separated by a modern enterprise system, and a variety of roles within the company of rights and responsibilities of the segments were separated too, Their aims is to make the best use of people in order to achieve the overall productive operation. Manager in such a system is rightly important, although they can not directly owned enterprises, but it has a great operation and management rights.How shareholders to monitor, control, manager is a modern enterprise faces a common problem. Deal with the general employees of the traditional practice is to give a fixed salary and bonuses, but for the management of personnel, the incentive is too rigid and can not bring the management staff of its own interests and business interests closely.together or can not really effectively form a concerted effort. In this case, managers do not have enough sense of responsibility, feeling of constriction, and a sense of belonging that is not surprising. Moreover, the fixed salary and bonuses are short-term incentives, if other companies can give a more lucrative salary conditions, managers are likely to leave their pursuit of greater business benefits.In my context, the emergence of a good equity incentive models to fill the traditional blind spots of conventional incentive model, in the long-term incentives in particular is playing an irreplaceable role.As the shareholders and management of information asymmetry that exists between the management there is the issue of moral hazard and adverse selection, agency costs are inevitable. For the people who pursuit the wealth maximization of the shareholders, need to stimulate the selection and implementation which can increase shareholder wealth in order to minimize the agency costs.Equity-based incentives in reducing agency costs, to stimulate talent and professionalism of management, change management mechanisms and improve the company's human capital, and the situation has played a prominent role.In recent years, the Chinese government and listed companies actively promote the implementation of incentives, especially equity incentives.In December 2005,the SFC issued a "listed company's equity incentive management approach",January 1,2006 formally implemented. Since then, China's listed company equity incentive construction in full swing. After the Commission has successively promulgated the implementation of equity-based incentives for the three memoranda of listed companies and implementation of equity incentive plans to further regulate the operation, strict requirements. Chinese government attaches great importance to the promotion of equity-based incentives work.The relationship between equity incentives and corporate performance studied earlier abroad, and also more mature, this study provided some ideas and theoretical basis.However, because of its object of study is not our business, coupled with foreign scholars in which the object of study for the capital market is relatively mature compared with domestic enterprises to further improve the internal governance structure, legal system environment does have a significant difference in the income of foreign scholars out the conclusions applied to the practice of our equity-based incentives on the existence of certain limitations. Equity-based incentives in China's development is still relatively slow, China is undergoing economic restructuring, although the listed companies in special circumstances and conditions, but many scholars in this field in recent years have also made some research and try to explore. Due to various reasons, such as economic environment, performance indicators, selection, study time, the domestic equity incentive in the study the relationship between corporate performance and the quite different conclusions.The overall objective of this study was that the listed company's management equity incentive study; the study mainly covers the literature related to equity incentive results and theoretical basis, listed companies in China the status of equity-based incentives, China's equity incentive process of development and change, the management equity incentive right the relationship between the performance of listed companies, improve the equity incentive scheme proposal and the equity incentive models recommendations.In this paper, starting from the Introduction to explain the background to the study, purpose, ideas, research and research framework and structure of the contribution; again for the domestic equity incentive literature reviewed, summarized, and comments, and pointed out the inadequacies of research and the need for further research problem;expounded the concept of equity-based incentives, role, analyzes the theoretical basis of equity-based incentives related, including the principal-agent theory, human capital theory, property rights theory and two-factor theory of motivation, these theories based research and analysis of this paper has laid a foundation; then analyzes the current overall situation of China's equity incentive, including the equity incentive development process, current situation and emerging issues;the empirical analysis section, the first on the implementation of equity-based incentives for listed companies with the overall performance of listed companies to compare, from the management holding stock ratio and the correlation between corporate performance point of view of the empirical analysis to test China's listed companies, the implementation of equity incentive effects;finally come to the main conclusions of this paper and propose improved management of listed companies in China equity incentive proposals and suitable for China's enterprises The equity incentive model, and summarized the shortcomings of this article, and looked to the future may continue to research directions.In this paper, the research process empirical analysis and normative analysis will be combined to ensure that the research and discussion of the problems can be both objectivity and practicality; the same time, the use of a comparative analysis of research methods, the overall conduct of inspection, the implementation of equity incentive listed companies and all listed companies on a comparative analysis of performance;the use of established mathematical model to test the management of equity-based incentives and the relationship between company performance, testing the implementation of equity incentive in our results. In the study time frame, this paper defined as the time in 2008,so that the data are the latest data. The specific sample selection on the 2008 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies and implementation of equity-based incentives announced by the company identified as the sample is not removed after the announcement of the implementation of equity incentive or cancel the company. Institute of the data used are from the country Tai'an database.By studying the main conclusions of this paper there are four points; First, the management of equity-based incentives in its development stage, the application of listed companies in a smaller proportion of the management stake was too small; second incentive model is very restrictive, most use of stock options and restricted stock; three equity incentive in the application process, there have been many problems, such as moral hazard, excessive incentives and so on. Fourth, the management of equity-based incentives and a positive correlation between corporate performance. From the two on equity incentive and corporate financial performance of the relevant test results, the net capital gains rate and the ratio of book value and management ownership between the positive correlation between the so listed companies in China to implement the management equity incentive effect is good. From the theoretical analysis we can see:the management of equity-based incentives is a long-term incentive measures on the management of the implementation of equity-based incentives, the market acceptance of the company to improve, as the management holding company stock in itself is the performance of the company's confidence in the future will affect the investors to judge. At the same time, the management, after the holding of equities, but also improve the stock price momentum,they can increase their wealth.