Supply Chain Coordination With Revenue Sharing Contract

Current economic globalization and competitive market environment have impelled enterprises's decision-making to transform from independent to collaborative in the supply chain; greater emphasis, therefore, has been laid upon supply chain management, which not only embodies the core ideal of "cooperation, win-win, and integration", but also helps to realize win-win outcome by establishing a cooperative mutual relation between enterprises's supply chain nodes.Supply chain contract has proved an efficacious method for improving coordination among members of the supply chain. Revenue sharing contract, one type of a supply chain contract, performs a unique role in coordinating the interests of parties involved.This thesis analyzes revenue sharing contract under different conditions, and offers reference for suppliers and retailers. It initially channel coordination through revenue sharing contract between a single retailer and a single supplier in a single-period newsboy problem, which is categorized as either a model with fixed retail price or one under price-sensitive demand.Illustrated from simple to complex, the models present the coordination mechanisms and influence of revenue-sharing contract under different circumstances, with looser assumptions, introductions of new parameters, and changes in the conditions of the original parameters. This thesis further studies the two-period model under the revenue sharing contract by comparing revenue-sharing contracts with price protection policy and coordination mechanism, and analyzes the its impact on supply chain coordination when an important parameter generates different distribution coefficient. Aiming at maximizing the profit, the thesis applies probability and mathematical statistics, operations research, and game theory to obtain the optimal order quantity and distribution coefficient of the scope in supply chain, and verifies the method by numerical examples.