Research On Managerial Ownership Effect Of Non-State-Own Listed Companies' Performance

After tradable share reform finished, the contradictions between non-tradable and tradable shareholders has been resolved, but the agent problems between shareholders and managers are gradually noticeable. Managerial ownership as an effective solution of principal-agent problems because of separation of ownership, arouses more and more concern by the academia. In theory, with the lifting of non-tradable shares, interests of the shareholders of listed companies begin consistency, being bigger and stronger gradually become the company's common goal. Based on that, the introduction of managerial ownership has a positive impact on reducing agency costs and improving company performance. However, whether these incentives can produce the desired effect in China? It also remains to be tested in practice. In this context, this article conducts a study on managerial ownership effect of companies' performance. In addition, on account of serious flaws of influence from Managerial Ownership to the performance of state-owned listed companies in research on the theory, the results of empirical research would be affected then. Therefore only non-state-owned listed are companies selected for the study of this paper, for more applicable and relevant theoretically and greater practical significance.This paper is composed of five chapters. The first chapter is the introduction of background, significance, research ideas, the basic framework and research methods and also consists of generalization of the domestic and foreign literature and emphasis on the innovation and features of this paper. In the second part of this article, the correlation of managerial ownership and companies'performance is described using principal-agent and human capital theory. Then, this paper selects 2007-2008 Annual Report data as the sample after the share reform, using accounting indicators and market indicators to measure the performance of the company. Analyzing the managerial ownership on corporate performance with empirical method, the results showed that managerial ownership effect of non-state-own listed companies' performance presence the interval effect. The relationship of them becomes N-shaped curve. The fifth chapter is the research conclusions and policy recommendations of this thesis. Reasonable and effective recommendations are proposed on how to implement stock incentives in non-state-owned listed companies and ensure the management stock incentive developing in the healthy way based on the specific conditions in our country.The innovation of this paper is new perspective on selection of non-state-owned listed companies as the sample of this study owing to serious flaws of influence from Managerial Ownership to the performance of state-owned listed companies in research on the theory and to the results of empirical research. In addition, paper selects the 2007-2008 data of Annual Report as the sample after the share reform, using accounting indicators and market indicators to measure the performance of the company, analyzing of the managerial ownership on corporate performance with empirical method, wishing to draw more accurate conclusions and provide reference for equity incentive of non-state-owned listed companies.