An Empirical Analysis On The Relation Of The Managerial Ownership And Corporate Performance About Listed Companies In China

The separation of ownership and management of the modern corporation emerge the Principal-agent problem, it cause that the objective of principal and agent is inconsistent. The owner need to establish the incentive and restraint mechanism to supervise and stimulate the operator behavior,make their behavior accord with the interest of the owner, so as to reduce the agency costs. From the practice of the western corporations, the managerial ownership mechanism was considered one of effective ways solving the problem, It make the operator become the owner, thereforce, make the owner and the operator benefit to be consistent. In recent years,the managerial ownership mechanism is used by so many companies as one of the incentive mechanisms in our country, then whether the incentive mechanism can emerge the incentive effect which it should have in our country, this waited for the practice docimasia.This article is for the purpose of analyzing the relation of the managerial ownership and corporate performance about listed companies in our country, and carries on the analysis from three levels. The first level analyzes if there are correlated in each other; The second level analyzes "which is the cause, which is the result"; The third level analyzes if they are correlated, what relation is it. This article take 743 listed companies in our country as to be the analysis sample, take the empirical analysis as key analysis approach.Looked from the the empirical analysis result, between the managerial ownership and corporate performance about listed companies in our country has the strong positive correlation; The proportion of the managerial ownership decides corporate performance, corporate performance can not decide the proportion of the managerial ownership, and exists "sector effect". In present, the proportion of the managerial ownership is too low in our country, far smaller than the optimum proportion therefore listed companies should improve the proportion of the managerial ownership in our country.This article is divided five parts, The first part is the preface, in this part, introduces the research background, significance of topic and the literature summary; The second part is theories, describes the managerial ownership and corporation performance theories; The third part is "the sample and the variable", mainly introduces the sample and the variable selection; The fourth part is the empirical analysis, this is the key part of the article, analysis the relationship between equity incentive and those companies...