An Empirical Research On Private Benefits Of Control,Ownership Structure And Other Influencing Factors

At present,there are two kinds of agency costs that are popular with economists:First,the conflict of interest between owners and operators leads to agency costs;Second,the conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and other investors leads to agency costs.With the further concentration of stock,the focus of modern corporate governance has moved from principal-agent relationship between owners and operators to the issue of occupation between major shareholders and small shareholders."Private benefits of control"is the core of this issue.This paper analyzes the mechanism and influencing factors of private benefits of control from the equity structure of listed companies in China,and selecting 825 samples of equity agreements events in Chinese A-share market between 2003 to 2007.On the base of non-tradable shares of stock's transfer,calculation result shows that the private benefits of control in Chinese listing company is about 1.57%,and the value in control transfer company is about 3.60%,which is above that in developed country. This paper establishes a multiple linear regression model to analyzing the influencing factors of private benefits of control and the relation between ownership structure and private benefits. Through the research and analysis,we have come to regression conclusions:there are significant negative correlations between private benefits of control and the company scale,the sum of holding shares from the second shareholders to the fifth,the scale of negotiable stock;But there are significant positive correlations between private benefits of control and the asset-liability ratio,the transfer of shares,the holding shares of the first shareholders,the control of controlling shareholders,the degree of equity of checks and balances,the degree of stock dispersion. Finally, this paper puts forward the advices about reducing the private benefits of control in Chinese listed companies.