Studies On Chinese Farmland Expropriation

Farmland expropriation refers to the needs of countries, because of the public interest, compulsory land acquisition and in accordance with relevant laws and regulations provides some compensation. Land acquisition process involves the central government, local governments, land users, farmers and peasants and many other subjects of collective rights and duties of land rights, by its very nature is the handover between the different subjects, which is the land property in a special economic manifestation. Generated in the course of the illegal land requisition land requisition and uneven income distribution, against the rights and interests of the farmers have been affected to some extent, social stability and harmony, so studying this issue has important economic, social and legal implications.In this paper, the economics of "rational economic man" as the basic assumptions, and based on public choice theory, that the Government is actually a group of rational economic behavior of people under a certain rule-bound behavior. On this basis, the full text of the integrated use of survey method, literature research methods, interdisciplinary research method and descriptive research methods such as research methods, through property rights theory, game theory and theories of principal-agent model analyzes China's current land acquisition system has drawbacks and reasons, the same time, put forward some countermeasures and suggestions.First of all, this article analyzes the use of property rights theory, China's current land ownership system defects, mainly as vague collective land property rights, farmers'collective property interests do not complete. Because China's farmers from the land ownership is allocated directly given by the state, rather than through market transactions to obtain complete, so as to land ownership rights of ownership enjoyed by people is also limited, this is the land requisition system, the root cause of problems.Next, through the use of game theory analysis of the main participants in land:the central government, local governments, farmers, and their collective interests drive the relationship between the interests of the game. The analysis revealed between the central and local governments, local governments throughout the last the next local governments, local governments and farmers are the existence of the collective interests of the game between the relationships. Interests of the central and local governments decided to open land 37 between the distributions of income ratio; huge benefits also strongly driven around the local government, local governments, and large-scale land acquisition sessions; while the farmers in order to obtain more land yields will try to the delay time for land acquisition negotiations.Finally, the paper focuses on analysis of China's land requisition compensation for the problems, of which the most prominent issue is the land of serious irrational distribution of income. By analyzing the principal-agent model was found:only give farmers the right to vote independently in order to have a real interests of the villagers agent, in order effectively to protect the interests of farmers are not impaired.China's current system of land transactions by the Government for low-cost land from farmers and then sold at high prices by the government to the land units, and then the formation of such a transaction price is not the market price? If not, pricing of such transactions will generate social welfare losses? Will produce the number of losses? These questions need further study. In addition, due to lack of knowledge of law and economics, this paper analysis of the land acquisition process seems too simple; these are the inadequacies of this article.