Research On The Relationship Between Managerial Ownership And The Value Of Chinese Listed Companies

The separation of enterprise,s management and ownership is one of characteristic for modern enterprise system. The separation forms the principal-agent problem between corporate shareholders and operator. Because of information asymmetry and the rationalistic presuppositions, the principal-agent problem led to agency problem of modern corporate governance. In order to solve the principal-agent problem, we need to solve the problem of equity incentive. Equity incentive is one important parts of modern corporate governance. Equity incentive solves the conflict of interest by managerial owners some shares. In recent years, the managerial ownership mechanism is used by so many companies as one of the incentive mechanisms in our country, the incentive effect which it should have in our country, this waited for the practice decimation. In this background, this study can provide theoretical guidance for equity incentive and have a great practical significance.On the basis of summarizing the related researches and literatures on managerial ownership and firm values, by foreign and national scholars, introduced the theoretical basis which supporting the managerial ownership, analyses the principal-agent theory, human capital theory and entrepreneur profit theory, put forward two hypotheses, considering the status of managerial ownership by Chinese firms, found two models and apply empirical analysis. Based on the date of the 374 listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange, mainly uses statistical and analytic method to examine the relation between managerial ownership and corporate value. Chosen Tobin,s Q value, Return on Equity as a measure of corporate value;chosen the entity size, earnings per share, growing capability and leverage as control variables.Empirical studies show that there is a week correlation between managerial ownership and corporate value. The main reasons are limited a mount of shares, ineffective of the capital markets and manager markets, internal governance mechanisms invalidated and so on. At least, the essay analyses the reasons of the empirical results and proposes the advice from several different aspects.