| At present China's Listed Companies affiliated transactions carry through frequently, and trading amount of money huge, non-fair affiliated transactions Prevalence. Especially the majority shareholder and its affiliates occupied listed companies'funds. In stock market, part of the of major shareholders holding control and"Tunneling"(Even"Emptied") Listed company is not Rare, Seriously affected the credibility of listed companies and the securities market's healthy development.In theory, the legal system has a fundamental role to prevent the large shareholders using affiliated transactions to fleece the company, but in countries with weak legal systems, the level of corporate governance is particularly important and effective, governance effectively can be to some extent make up for deficiencies in the legal environment. During the fragile situation of the legal environment in China at this stage, to improve corporate governance is the use of related-party transactions to resolve the controlling shareholder of the primary means of draining the company. As the center of corporate internal governance structure of the board of directors, its operational efficiency and functions is directly related to the company operations as well as the vital interests of many stakeholders. This paper break through research methods before, combine theory and empirical analysis, intends to build statistical models to the 384 manufacturing companies as the study sample for empirical testing, analysis of the board governance variables on the impact of related party transactions, Empirical study shows: though it shows the tendency of correlation, it did not significance, board administer hasn't brought into play. And then through typical case prove empirical results. Thus according to the results put forward perfect internal governance recommendations that effectively inhibit the behaviors of affiliated transactions of listed companies transfer benefits and interests of the occupation. |
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