The Research On The Incentive Mechanism For Infrastructure Sharing In Telecommunications

Infrastructure sharing in telecommunications can effectively reduce the redundant construction and increase the utility of the infrastructure. Simultaneously, the transfer from the low-efficiency network competition of the telecom operators to the products and service competition would ultimately enhance the customer value and contribute to a steady and rapid development of our telecommunications industry. Considering the serious redundancy of construction and the new round of telecom restructuring, it is imperative to implement telecommunications infrastructure sharing.Due to the lack of inside incentives for infrastructure sharing, this thesis will find some possible solutions through the following 3 areas. At first, the thesis use comparative study to analyze and summarize the practical experiences and emerging issues of the domestic and abroad telecommunications infrastructure sharing implementations. At second, the thesis builds a model based on the game theory to discover the Cost-benefit function of telecom operators, the issues needing attention snd some policy suggestions in the specific implementation of infrastructure sharing. At last, by introducing factors of amortized cost and the negotiations time into the model, the thesis concludes some results that the amortized cost factor is determined by the operator's operating costs, market share and cost of network construction and the negotiations time is related to degree of market competition among operators. The higher degree of competition in the market areas (such as the urban market), the shorter of the negotiation the, and the government control of it in such areas should be stricter and the acts of deliberate foot-dragging should be strictly punished; and vice versa.