The Empirical Study Of Property Rights, Investment Efficiency And Bank Credit Resource Allocation

As the main mean of fund-raising for firms in china, the efficiency of bank credit resource allocation is vital to the operation of national economy and firms'financing decision.This paper discussed the problem of china's bank credit resource collation from the perspective of property rights and investment efficiency.Different property rights determined different invest behavior based on different agent cost attributed from different ownership.This paper using asset turnover as the proxy for agent cost, discovers that it's a significant negative relation between agent cost and investment efficiency, that is, the higher degree of agent cost, the higher degree of under investment or higher degree of over investment.This conclusion is suitable to center state-holder companies, local state-holder companies, and private-holder companies.From the comparing with different property rights companies, compared to the state block-holder companies, private holder companies are more inclined to under investment, but with the increase of asset turnover, the degree of under investment of private holder companies is decreased faster than state block holder companies.Property rights, investment efficiency and their interaction have significant affect on the bank credit resource allocation.The regression results indicate that that firms that more level of over-investment got more loans from banks;compared to private holder companies, with the increase of degree of over-investment, state holder companies got more loans from banks. The higher degree of under-investment, companies got fewer loans from banks.The conclusions of this paper have important value for realizing the facts that the bank credit resources have input more to over-invest state-holding companies and the efficiency of resource allocation is still room to improve.