Research On Assets Allocation Of Listed Companies Based On The Perspective Of Residual Property Rights

The investment behavior of corporate has been paid close attention to,especially the problem of investment performance,which relates to the growth of enterprises and the protection of investors,has always been a hot topic in academic research.2016 is the first year of China's"Thirteen five-year plan"."Play a key role in the growth of investment,optimize the investment structure" are the new requirements of "Thirteen five-year plan" for innovation and development.Corporate investment is not only the basement for all the planning or recommendations including the "13th Five-Year Plan" really rooted,but also an important engine for achieving the "Thirteen Five" plan.As cells of the national economy,the problem of corporate investment is not only related to the creation of its own value,performance growth and sustainable development,but also a good medicine to boost investor confidence and promote the development of capital market.However,in recent years,Chinese corporates still exist problems of "redundant construction","underinvestment","overinvestment","macro-good and micor-bad","low return on investment" and so on.In addition,the current problems that China is now facing with excess capacity,is also related to the corporate unreasonable investment.As human capital owners,the mamager is the decision-maker of legal sense for business investment with professional management skills.Managers should be in accordance with the rational assumptions and scientific decision-making principles of investment decisions,however,many factors in reality will affect the management's investment decisions and is likely to make it distorted,and alienation for the specific entities in corporate for personal interests.The theoretical community referred underinvestment and overinvestment phenomenon as "inefficient investment." Scholars have explored and validated drivers and solutions for inefficient investment.Such as information asymmetry triggers insufficient investment,agency problems lead to over-investment,information disclosure to ease information asymmetry,corporate governance to solve agency problems.The above traditional theory is still applicable in explaining the investment behavior of modern corporate,but it is still not enough and sufficient to explain some problems in corporate investment.Therefore,it is necessary to develop a new research perspective or use the new research methods to further study for corporate investment.According to the view of property rights and its related theories,property rights is necessary and sufficient conditions for economic efficiency from static and dynamic characteristics.For corporate,the clarity of property rights reflects the advanced level of a corporate system.Property rights arrangement is the basis of corporate governance structure,corporate governance structure changes are all caused by changes in property rights.Therefore,all aspects of corporate governance and its' related including investment behavior are determined by property rights arrangements.The corporate property rights is further divided into the specific property rights and the residual property rights from the point of view of the completeness of the contract.Among them,corporate governance rules related to the specific property right have been stipulated in the relevant contract,and the residual property right related is not stipulated in the contract,related decisions need to be made with the subjective will of the remaining property owners,which reflected in the investment behavior is managers' investment decision-making discretion.The more blurred the boundary of the residual property,the greater the space for the discretion of the manager to make the decision-making,which is the contractual origin of the change and distortion of the corporate investment behavior.Therefore,this study attempts to explore and explain the corporate investment behavior from the perspective of corporate residual property arrangement,and try to explore the solution of investment problem from the arrangement of residual property rights.This is also an important innovation of this article.Another important innovation in this study is to look at corporate investment behavior from the perspective of assets allocation.Capital investment,from the initial to the end is all involved in a variety of changes or transforms of assets,including the cash assets for initial and during the investment,and long-term assets for the end of the investment.How to deal with and coordinate the investment process of asset changes and transformation,that is,asset allocation problems,is also an important issues.Therefore,from the perspective of the asset allocation to research corporate investment,is not only contribute to enhance awareness of investment for economic entities,but also conducive to better evaluate the effectiveness of investment.The existing research on investment behavior,whether normative research or empirical research,are focused on view of cash flow,from the view of asset allocation are relatively few.Through the combination of normative analysis and empirical analysis,referring to the basic theories of corporate property rights theory,incomplete contract theory,management power theory,cash holding theory and corporate investment theory,fully combined with the institutional environment of our country,systematically researched the impact of the residual property rights arrangements of the manager as the owner of human capital on asset allocation,the following conclusions were drawn.On one hand,referring to the assets allocation benefits,first,there is a significant negative correlation between the symmetry degree of managers'residual property rights and both the size of cash assets allocation and the size of long-term assets allocation.The results futher show that the manager's symmetry degree of residual property rights are negatively correlated with the size of fixed assets allocation,the size of intangible assets allocation and the size of long-term equity investment allocation,and degree of significance desends according the order of long-term equity investment allocation,fixed assets and intangible assets.Second,there is a significant positive correlation between the degree of symmetry of managers' residual property rights and the benefits of both cash assets allocation and long-term assets allocation.Third,compared with the state-owned listed companies,the positive correlation between symmetry degree of managers' residual property rights and the allocation benefits of cash assets,and the positive correlation between symmetry degree of managers' residual property rights and long-term asset allocation benifits is more significant in non-state-owned listed companies.On the other hand,referring to the assets allocation efficiency,first,the symmetry degree of managers' residual property rights is significantly positively correlated with asset allocation efficiency.Second,compared with the state-owned listed companies,the positive correlation between the symmetry degree of managers' residual property rights and asset allocation efficiency is more significant in non-state-owned listed companies.Third,the property rights protection mechanism of listed companies has synergistic or alternative effect on the correlation between the symmetry degree of managers' residual property rights and asset allocation efficiency.In particular,the institutional environment and product market competition play a synergistic effect;institutional investors' stockholdings and certified public accountants audit have played an alternative effect.Based on the above conclusions,four policy recommendations are proposed.First,establish and improve the mechanism for management to share the residual claims,achieve residual property rights symmetry of management;Second,according to the status of managers'residual claims,reasonablely arrange for managers' resudual control rights;Third,deepen the reform of property rights system of state-owned corporate,enhance the effectiveness of the residual property rights mechanism;Fourth,improve corporate's property rights protection mechanism,maximize the effectiveness of corporate assets allocation.