Corporate Control Right And Financing Decision

Since 1950s, the corporate finance has become a hot topic of modern financial theory. Corporate financing behavior is the micro-foundation in modern financial system; it has a very important position in monetary transmission mechanism. Corporate financing decision is not only constrained by the macroeconomic policy environment, but also directly affects the company's decision.In the company's operations process, the owner of of the right of control can affect the behavior of others to obtain control over the proceeds, therefore, the configuration of control right is bound to affect the company's overall value to be maximized.In developed markets, the company shares can be freely traded, but the non-tradable shares of Chinese enterprises account for a significant part of the control right market, which makes the control right market is unable to play its due role.Stocks and bonds are important means of corporate finance, but due to the rights and obligations between the two configurations are different, they may form different internal right structure. Therefore, the equity financing and debt financing can be seen as a enterprises' structure of control right, and how to configure the equity financing and debt financing as the proportion of corporate finance will be the factors that cannot be ignored, In the capital markets, shareholders and creditors always change, so the requirements of investors in the enterprise also change, the checks and balances on the corporate objectives of maximizing the firm's value take up a crucial role.During operation in the enterprise, entrepreneurs control, the supervision of the board of supervisors and independent directors, the threat of external competitors, the threat of a proxy fight, the creditors' control right and other factors form an organic control of the company system together, the system is the important component in a modern corporate governance structure. View of the above various factors, this paper set aside consideration of the risk of the external control right market, just decomposed the internal corporate control system into entrepreneurs, outside shareholders, creditors, managers, think about the sub-games between the above factors, combined with mathematical reasoning and proof, analyzed the system of internal control over the formation and mechanism.With the start point of feature of incomplete contract, this paper makes research on compensation mechanism in finance decision with the research object of control power. The structure of the paper was arranged as below:The first chapter describes the object of study and research methods, this part covered the main concepts and scope of the definition points out the main theoretical basis for this article, and a brief analysis of the main theories.The second chapter, after a clear overview of relative concepts, I give a description about the firm's capital structure theory research at home and abroad. Corporate finance structure theory development process is accompanied by the development of theory of the firm from the classical to the modern progressive development, and these constitute the theory of capital structure of the theoretical system, an overview of these theories are conducive to a clear awareness and understanding of capital structure in the important role of corporate finance.The third chapter is a key step of this study in order to control for the object analysis of the stakeholders when faced with conflict behavior choices. Entrepreneurs hold the ultimate control over the enterprise, they can configure the initial stages of control, and thus affecting the behavior of other control subjects; shareholders control can guarantee that the manager's agency cost down to a certain range; creditor control right can prevent shareholders'moral hazard; manager's control can ensure their access reach to their relative remuneration.The Game Model Construction and Solution in Chapter IV are also the main innovations in this article. Based on the first and second chapter, and combined with Chapter III of the various interest groups analysis and the stakeholders of the game strategy, I analyzed the game between the subject participation constraint and incentive constraints, building a theory model. The final chapter summing up the conclusions of this model is mainly based on the property rights reform of China's state-owned enterprises policy proposals, hoping through the control of state-owned enterprises to safeguard the rational allocation of the security of state-owned assets, and to promote the smooth progress of the reform of state-owned property. In the end of the study, I pointed out shortcomings at this stage, and pointed out that further research directions.