Studies On Performance Of Private Listed Corporate Governance In China

With the rapid development of private enterprises, a large number of talent are introduced by companies, While ownership and management rights are gradually separated, The enterprises have to consider and address corporate governance issues. With the acceleration of world economic integration, private listed companies face an even more severe situation in the rapidly changing business environment, It has become the business community, government and academics concern problem that private enterprises how to establish a market economic system of modern enterprise system.Firstly, This paper introduces the theory of transaction costs, property rights theory, agency theory, management motivation theory, super-property rights theory, stakeholder theory of corporate governance theory. Analysis the impact of China's Private Listed Companies factors. Then study the corporate governance of China's private listed performance, using the SPSS multiple regression and quadratic regression curve of empirical methods. We find that the ownership concentration has a positive role in improving performance in China's private listed companies; appropriate board size and scale of independent directors on corporate governance will have a positive effect on performance; managers who have ownership don't affect the governance performance greatly. Finally, on the basis of empirical research, combined with foreign corporate governance model, we put forward China's private listed companies to enhance the performance of the proposed governance:to change equity structure, to increase institutional investors; use foreign experience, combined with their own national conditions, improve the system board, so that board size be maintained at a "full discussion can both quickly and accurately for scientific decision-making,"; perfect stock option system environment, establish a sound scientific performance appraisal system and monitoring system outside the enterprise.