Shanghai Private Car License Auction Analysis

The price of private vehicle license (PVL) jagged up science the application of unreserved PVL auction, January 2000. As for the auction system leaded unstable high PVL-price and fear about the nonpublic information, the government modified the content in two ways in January 2008. On one hand, they made the auction process information available to the public. On the other hand, they limit the amount of the increase of bidding price. However, there are still problems left unresolved in the new controversial auction system, while no in-depth academic research was done. In response to this situation, this paper focuses on empirical research about the PVL auction and offers design recommendations.The purposes of applying auction system are limiting the increments of motor vehicles to improve transportation, reducing traffic congestion, improving air quality in order to improve overall ecological environment condition and making proceeds to provide more convenient transportation. At the mention of auction system designation, do ensure the fairness, justice and openness of the system. It is not only necessary to prevent speculators, but also to safeguard the interests of bidders. What's more, the auction should ensure an efficient resource allocation. In order to design an appropriate auction system, the international common practice is that by selecting some intellectual experts'suggestions, the best one is chosen after empirical study. So, we follow these steps in this auction system designation.This article is divided into five chapters. The first chapter presented the historical background of Shanghai PVL auction and the current major issues of the auction system, including the inefficient allocation of resource, loss of government revenue, large bid gap, market manipulation and excessive burden on the network system; the second chapter is about The Theories of Auction, the auction theory offers an online auction framework based mainly on the hypothetical deduction. There are still many problems that need attention. After that, we introduce some conclusions of empirical tests; the third chapter describes the Five Elements of Shanghai PVL auction, and analyzes the secondary market of PVL. And we studied the behavior of people under both ideal and real conditions; the fourth chapter focuses on data analysis, we studies the number of bidders and the minimum prices of PVL in a time manner, respectively. Besides, we analyzed the situations when extremely low prices appear; the fifth chapter analyzes the defects in the current auction system. Then, we submit a relatively rational auction system that still needs assessment.