Guarantee Behavior Of Listed Companies Associated Influencing Factors Research

Connected guarantee is the most typical form of the guarantee behaviors of Chinese listed companies. In recent years, connected guarantee behaviors of listed companies have happened frequently and the guarantee amount is large which involved enormous financial risk. From those exposed guarantee problems, we could see that the connected guarantee behaviors have caused frequent lawsuits, which have great negative effects on the financial institutions and the capital market. Although the supervising and managing department has paid close attention to those problems and carried out some policies, the amount of the listed companies involved in connected guarantee as well as the connected guarantee amount is quite large, which caused enormous financial risk. Which factors indeed influenced connected guarantee behaviors of the listed companies became the problem that need researching. Most former researches about this problem are of the theoretical analysis, because the guarantee information disclosure of listed companies is irregular and the cost of gathering the guarantee data is high. In addition, the former empirical analysis about guarantee problems is of the case analysis, by means of which they describes the dangers and the factors of guarantee behaviors of Chinese listed companies. For these reasons, my thesis focuses on the influencing factors of connected guarantee behaviors of listed companies.After reviewing the former research and the relevant theory basis, we described the present condition of the connected guarantee behaviors of listed companies and theoretically analyzed the influencing factors of connected guarantee behaviors. In the empirical analysis part, we examined the influence of the ownership structure, the characters of the board of directors, operation achievement, levels of debt, the state of connected fund occupation, the risk of connected guarantee as well as the local government's intervention on the connected guarantee behaviors of listed companies by means of pearson correlation coefficient analysis, independent-samples T test and multiple linear regression analysis. And we drew the following conclusion: The more the shares proportion of the first majority shareholder is, the lower the degree of connected guarantee behaviors will be. The less the proportion of circulated shares is, the higher the degree of connected guarantee behaviors will be. The connected guarantee of the listed companies in which the president is concurrently the general manager is more serious than those in which the president is not concurrently the general manager. The poorer the operation achievement is, the higher the degree of connected guarantee behaviors will be. The higher the debt level is, the higher the degree of connected guarantee behaviors will be. Those listed companies which occupied the connected fund less, may provide more connected guarantee to transfer interest. Yet the factors such as the proportion of the independent directors, the risk of the connected guarantee and the local government's intervention don't have significant influence on the connected guarantee behaviors of the listed companies,The new opinions of my thesis are as follows: (1)There is only Alignment Effect rather than Entrenchment Effect when the controlling holders transfer interest through connected guarantee. Compared with the other method of interest transfer, such as connected transaction based on unfair price, connected fund occupation and distributing much dividend, connected guarantee behavior has its particularity. That is it involves enormous risk. Along with the increase of the shares proportion, the controlling shareholders will worry about the risk and their motive of "tunneling" by means of connected guarantee will lessen.(2) For the listed companies, the higher the connected fund occupation ratio is, the lower the degree of connected guarantee behavior will be. When the supervising and managing department attached great importance to both the connected fund occupation and the connected guarantee problems and try to regulate these behaviors, as the listed companies, the degree of the connected guarantee has negative correlation with the connected fund occupation ratio. It means that connected guarantee is kind of the subsitute for connected fund occupation to transfer interest.