Construction Of State - Owned Enterprise Supervision System Based On Incentive Compatibility

At present, the research on the supervision of state-owned enterprises, ourcountry pays more attention to the incentive constraint on theexecutive, ignored and avoided the optimization of incentive for regulators, in ourcountry to the SASAC for the model of state-owned enterprises supervisionsystem dominated by state-owned enterprises, further focus on regulatorypowers, such as external supervision is not in place, regulators andsupervisors arepossible corruption of opportunistic behavior, and even the useof power rent-seeking, rent seeking, and supervision work will be a mereformality and programmed in a certain extent, efficiency supervisionmay deviatefrom the design of the system of heart. This paper takes the economic behaviorcharacteristics set forthe starting point of analysis, emphasis on asymmetricinformation and limited rationality conditions on the behavior subject of opportunisticbehavior control. Especially based on the supervision system of state-ownedenterprises to participate in the party’s interests angle, through discussion, the relevanttheoretical summary of practical experience, and analyzes the current situation ofYunnan Province, the existing problems of the state owned assets supervision andadministration, standing on the perspective of the incentive compatibility, seek truthfrom facts to evaluate the gains and losses of construction supervision system, toexplore the principle of incentive compatibilityof theenterprise supervision system based on. Thus the utility of informationasymmetry, the inconsistent case,through scientific and rational design ofthe supervision system, make individual interests and collective interestsas much aspossible mutual unity, with the constraint, incentive, system designers need to reachthe goal, make state-owned capital can play a maximum efficiency, to create thegreatest social wealth.